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ABSTRACT ' ^"'- '''"^
On 16 December 1971, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted Resolution 2832 (XXVI) declaring the
Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with
its air space and sea bed, to be a zone of peace. The
resolution also called upon the Great Powers to enter into
negotiations with the littoral states of the region to halt
any further escalation of their military presence and to
eliminate all bases and other Great Power competition.
This paper examines the history of the zone of peace
process as it relates to the interests of three states:
the United States, the Soviet Union, and India. Particular
attention is devoted to the Soviet and Indian positions,
and how each nation's regional interests have led to
divergent views on the topic. The work concludes that
previous attempts to make the Indian Ocean into a zone of
peace have concentrated on drafting international
resolutions and reducing naval arms, while ignoring the
central problem of competing national interests.
Confidence-building measures related to these interests
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I. INTRODUCTION
On 16 December 1971, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted Resolution 2832 (XXVI) declaring the
Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with
its air space and sea bed , to be a zone of peace . The
resolution also called upon the Great Powers to enter into
negotiations with the littoral states of the region to halt
any further escalation of their military presence and to
eliminate all bases and other Great Power competition. Yet
today, ten years since this resolution was adopted, nego-
tiations over the withdrawal of non-littoral forces from
the region are deadlocked, and the prospects of the Indian
Ocean ever becoming a zone of peace appear grim.
This paper retraces the history of the zone of peace
process and examines what the resolution means to two close
friends in Asia: the Soviet Union and India. Whereas many
studies of the zone of peace issue focus on a means of
reducing the non-littoral naval presence in the region,
this work concentrates on the clash of interests . The
thesis of this work is that nations cannot realistically
sit down to discuss disarmament before the national inter-
ests of all parties have been defined and accommodated.
In chapter two, a brief history of the zone of peace
process, it will be seen that the Carter Administration

entered Naval Arms Limitation Talks (NALT) without having
defined U.S. interests, or the force levels necessary to
defend them in an emergency. When Soviet activity in-
creased on the Horn of Africa in the midst of NALT, the
Administration was forced to take account of its strategic
interests. After making these calculations, the Admini-
stration realized that an augmentation of the U.S.
presence, and not a reduction or a freeze, was in order.
Chapter three discusses Moscow's interest in the Indian
Ocean and the zone of peace resolution. As will be seen,
enactment of the nonaligned nations' proposal would fulfill
some Soviet strategic objectives; but it would also
eliminate certain rights currently guaranteed by inter-
national law. Thus far, Moscow has demonstrated its
willingness to negotiate a reduction of naval armaments on
its southern flank, but has never considered eliminating
other forms of superpower competition.
Chapter four examines the foreign policy objectives of
India, a nonaligned nation on the littoral of the Indian
Ocean. Although Moscow and New Delhi have enjoyed a close
post-war relationship, their views diverge on the zone of
peace issue. Moscow subscribes to the balance-of-power
theory, and believes that withdrawal of Western armed
forces from the Indian Ocean would enhance Soviet influence
within the region. India, on the other hand, believes that
withdrawal of non-littoral forces would result in an

increase in the power of nonaligned nations, to the
detriment of both Eastern and Western influence. More
importantly, India views such a withdrawal as the first
step toward realizing its destiny as the premier power of
the Indian Ocean, and one of the Great Powers in
international arbitration.
The final chapter reflects upon the question of
interests in international negotiations. The zone of peace
resolution challenges non-littoral interests because it
attempts to circumvent the norms of international law. By
placing regional restraints upon international actors , the
resolution seeks to serve only regional interests, and thus
opens the door to a regional system, governed by the most
powerful. This doctrine, which would give nonaligned
nations the right to adjudicate events in their own back
yard, ironically resembles Soviet action in Eastern Europe
and American involvement in the Western Hemisphere.
Obviously these are poor substitutes for proper inter-
national legislation. The United Nations should be
arbitrating agreements which guarantee the equal rights of
all states and all citizens; not resolutions which give
special privilege to regional or superpower actors.
10

II . HISTORY OF THE ZONE OF PEACE PROCESS
A. THE POST-WAR YEARS: 1945-1966
Following the second World War, the U.S. Navy estab-
lished a three-vessel Middle East Force, homeported in the
Persian Gulf at Bahrain, in 1949. U.S. interest in the
region was largely limited to containing the spread of
communism, a task assisted by British and French forces
throughout the region.
But in a meeting with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru
on 17 December 1963, General Maxwell Taylor advised the
Indian leader that the U.S. was considering sending some
ships of the Seventh Fleet cruising through the Indian
Ocean for the purpose of getting acquainted with the seas
of the region. [1] When questioned about the conversation
during Parliamentary Debates two days later. Prime Minister
Nehru indicated a policy consistent with international law:
If the U.S. Government decides to (cruise in these
areas), all that we need say... is that outside the
territorial waters of India, the ocean is, naturally,
open to them, as to the vessels of any other
country. [2]
Although the members of Parliament agreed with Nehru's
translation of the law, Hem Barua posed a question to the
Prime Minister which reflected the anxiety of a growing
number of nations in the region:
11

True it is that the United States' extension of 7th
Fleet operations into the Indian Ocean is not dependent
on our permission. But may I enquire from our Prime
Minister whether this extension, if it is a fait
accompli
,
of course, would not or might not mean an
invitation to other powers, particularly antagonistic
to us, [3] to do a similar thing, thus jeopardizing our
security? [4 J
Nehru denied the U.S. presence would represent such an
invitation, adding:
I doubt very much if there is any other power which is
capable of sending a considerable number of ships
roundabout here. [5 J
Less than a year later , thinking among many Third World
nations had changed. The October 1964 Conference of
Nonaligned Nations in Cairo expressed displeasure with
international tensions arising out of East-West competition
for alliances and pacts . Following the leads of African
and Latin American countries seeking to denuclearize their
respective continents and various proposals pertaining to
the denuclearization of areas in Europe and Asia, Mrs.
Sirimavo Bandaranaike , the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka,
proposed a resolution, which was accepted by the Confer-
ence, calling for the denuclearization of Africa, the
Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic. [6] Perhaps equally
important , the Cairo Conference condemned the maintenance
or future establishment of foreign military bases in the
Indian Ocean as an indefensible extension of neo-colonial-
ism and imperialism, designed to intimidate the emerging
countries of Africa and Asia.
12

But even as the Conference was registering its opinion,
Britain was preparing to create a new colony in 1 965 to
support communications and transit routes between Africa
and the Far East. London arranged the administrative
transfer of four of the least populated island groups from
two of its crown colonies--the Chagos Archipelago from
Mauritius, and the Aldaba , Desroches , and Farquhar groups
from the Seychelles-- to form the British Indian Ocean
Territory (BI0T).[7] This was done with the full agreement
of the governments of Mauritius and Seychelles to whom
compensation was paid (three million pounds to Mauritius
and an international airport constructed in the
Seychelles). Following the establishment of the BIOT, an
agreement was reached 1 3 December 1 966 between Great
Britain and the United States which made Diego Garcia, the
largest of the Chagos islands, available for the defense
purposes of both countries for an initial period of 50
years .
When the Exchange of Notes was made public in April
1967, there were strong protests from the nonaligned
nations of the region. Criticism focused on two issues:
the legality of Britain's procurement of the Chagos
Archipelago, and the possibility that United States' entry
into the Indian Ocean would result in other major powers
following its lead. The first complaint stemmed from the
13

fact that when Britain created the 3I0T, both Mauritius and
Seychelles were British colonies.
Since U.N. Resolution 1514 prohibits the dismeraber-
ment[8] of a country prior to its gaining independence, the
nonaligned nations consider the territorial transfers
illegal. This feeling was formally registered 4 January
1966 with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2066, which
stressed the procedural injustice of the British action,
noting
:
Any step by the administrating power to detach certain
islands from the territory of Mauritius for the purpose
of establishment of military bases would be in contra-
vention of resolution number 1514. [9 J
U.N. Resolution 2066 represented more than a protracted
focus on a legal technicality. It was a message (consis-
tent with previous statements by members of the nonaligned
nations) to Great Britain and France that colonialism was
not welcomed in the Indian Ocean. These two external
powers--and any others representing foreign pacts,
alliances, bases and troops--were deemed a threat to
regional interests and political sovereignty.
If anything threatened regional interests more than
European colonialism, however, it was the possibility of
superpower rivalry. While not content with the lingering
presence of Britain in the Indian Ocean, the littoral and
hinterland countries recognized that British military power
in Asia was waning. Some even accepted creation of the
14

British Indian Ocean Territories to give "transit, staging,
communication and refueling facilities to British .. .planes
going to the Far East," [10] to service British commitments
to Malaysia, Australia and Hong Kong if it meant a more
rapid departure of the British from all other littoral
nations. The British announcement in January 1968 that it
would withdraw all military forces from the area between
Aden and Singapore by 1972--its "East of Aden"[11] policy--
lent further credence to a belief that the power of the
British Empire continued its post-World War II decline.
Criticism of a growing U.S. presence in the region
stemmed from a rejection of the Western philosophy which
promoted foreign intervention. In this case the philosophy
was the balance of power thesis, which foresaw a "power
vacuum" in the wake of Britain's withdrawal from the Indian
Ocean arena. Western naval analysts ,[ 1 2 ] insensitive to
the aspirations of the littoral nations to fill any mili-
tary void left by retreating colonial powers and insecure,
even distrustful, of nonalignment policies, stressed "a
U.S. obligation" to fill the vacuum. Justifications for
the U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean included "stemming
historical Soviet aspirations for a warm water port,"
protecting vulnerable sea lanes and chokepoints through
which nearly 50% of the world's total oil supplies passed,
and emphasis upon the importance of these routes to close
allies, particularly Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New
15

Zealand and the members of ASEAN. Another concern was the
instability of the Middle East, and the need for a
secondary access route to the Persian Gulf and Red Sea
should U.S. interests in the region be threatened by
social, economic or political change. Finally, some
analysts were disturbed by a growing "regionalism" which
contemplated denying free transit to Western commercial and
military vessels. Talk of making the Persian Gulf an "Arab
Lake," Moscow's Asian Collective Security System; and
proposals for regional "sea control" (an Indian Ocean
Community) in the course of the zone of peace debates
seemed to challenge the right of external nations to use
the Indian Ocean in accordance with international law.
In rejecting the balance of power thesis, the littoral
nations were demanding a right to adjudicate events in
their own backyard. Arguing along lines now familiar in
North-South economic conferences, the Indian Ocean
countries stated the only way the West could correct a
"vacuum" was to help increase the economic strength of the
region .
Regional attempts to exclude nuclear weapons
,
great
power rivalries, and competition from the Indian Ocean, are
based on historical arguments, such as the following:
...it was the intrusion of... power rivalries into the
Indian Ocean, that resulted in the loss of political
freedom in Asia in the eighteenth century. [13 J
16

the build up of the British Navy for colonial purposes
is well-known .. .by building a strong navy they were
able to dominate a good part of the world and created
colonies, and we... became slaves at that time. [14]
Thus, were a scale consisting of "gradations of
undesireable possibilities" to be drawn up by the littoral
powers, the facility at Diego Garcia, where external
nations enjoy unimpeded access to sovereign bases , would
represent the least acceptable situation. On its unin-
habited atoll far away from Third World political
constraints, the U.S. and U.K. are free to make any mod-
ifications and store any combination of weapons required to
Intervene in a flare-up of global or regional proportion.
But a situation more attractive to littoral nations--
wherein external countries are dependent upon arrangements
with powers in the area to obtain bunkering and limited
support facilities--is the antithesis of an "unimpeded
access" strategy which Mahan has instilled in every Western
planner .
B. SUPERPOWER MOVEMENT: 1966-1973
Following the Exchange of Notes between Great Britain
and the United States in December 1966, there was nearly a
year of politico-military inactivity in the Indian Ocean.
Aside from the commissioning of a U.S. communication
station at the North West Cape in April 1967 (in pursuance
of an agreement signed between the United States and
Australia in 1963), [15] power balances within the region
17

remained stable. Mired in an escalating war in Vietnam,
the U.S. could not economically or politically afford to
apportion funds or forces to the Indian Ocean theatre. But
the January 1968 announcement of the pending British
withdrawal from East of Aden seemed almost like a catalyst
for superpower naval activity, as Table One reveals. [16]
Table I. Number of ship-days accumulated by the U.S. and
Soviet Navies, 1960-1973
1960-67 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Soviet Navy Nil 529 1,138 1,670 1,480 2,387 2,487
U.S. Navy [800]^ [800] [800] 872 858 990 1,410
Approximate number per year
.
Within three months of the British announcement , the
Soviet Union detached a small task force consisting of a
Sverdlov-class cruiser, a guided-miss ile destroyer, a
submarine and a Pevek -class oiler to visit ports in Aden,
Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, the Persian Gulf and
Somalia. [17] Following this March 1968 deployment, the
Soviets maintained a continuous presence in the region
while expanding their naval contingent to a squadron of
three to five surface ships and two or three submarines by
1970. During the Bangladesh War in 1971 and the Middle
East crisis in October 1973, the Soviets augmented their
18

naval forces--froni four to twenty combatants in the first
case, and from four to fourteen in the second. [18] Aside
from these deviations , however , the average number of ships
rarely exceeded eight.
The U.S. Navy, still embroiled in the Vietnamese con-
flict, only brought additional forces into the region
during the Indo-Pakistani War in 1971 and the Middle East
War in 1973. It was not until after 1 January 1972, when
the operational area of the U.S. Seventh (Pacific) Fleet
was extended into the Indian Ocean, and the Vietnam War was
tapering down, that the pattern of U.S. deployments began
to change
.
After four years of inactivity, the U.S. decided to
exercise its right of access to the British island of Diego
Garcia on 15 December 1970. An agreement was reached with
London to build a $19 million naval communications station
on the island for joint use. [19] As originally conceived,
this station would close a gap in the worldwide military
communications network between similar stations at Asmaj
(Ethiopia) and the North West Cape (Australia)
,
and
provide a link with ships and aircraft transiting the
Indian Ocean.
Concerned with the increasing presence of Soviet and
American naval combatants in the region, and convinced that
a U.S. facility not under regional control would motivate
the Soviet Union to seek an autonomous base of its own,
19

regional powers were quick to condemn the joint venture.
Speaking at the meeting of Commonwealth heads of government
in Singapore on 21 January 1971 , Mrs. Bandaranaike sum-
marized the anxiety of littoral nations:
Until now. . .neither the United States of America nor
the Soviet Union has had any bases on territories under
their control in the Indian Ocean, for stockpiling of
weapons or the conduct of dangerous operations in a
moment of crisis. The substance of our position is
that weapons attract weapons , and bases , whatever they
may be called, will attract bases from the opposing
parties. If either of the superpowers establishes a
naval base in the Indian Ocean, it will only be a
matter of time before the other follows suit. In this
context, we feel that there is a world of difference
between, for example, the British air base at Can
airfield in the Maldives, or the Indian and Pakistan
military installations in their respective territories,
and the base that Britain has agreed to place in Diego




Addressing the U.N. General Assembly on 12 October
1971, Prime Minister Bandaranaike built upon her Singapore
memorandum by proposing that the Indian Ocean be declared
"a zone of peace" reserved exclusively for peaceful pur-
poses, with the following rules in force:
Within the zone no armaments of any kind, defensive or
offensive, may be installed on or in the sea, on the
subjacent sea bed or on land areas. Ships of all
nations may exercise the right of transit but warships
and ships carrying warlike equipment including subma-
rines may not stop for other than emergency reasons of
a technical, mechanical, or humanitarian nature. No
maneuvers by warships of any State shall be permitted.
Naval intelligence operations shall be forbidden. No
weapon tests of any kind may be conducted, the regula-




Mrs . Bandaranaike realized that her proposal was incom-
patible with "customary and conventional international law
which seeks to preserve the seas beyond territorial waters
as open to all nations" .[ 22 ] Based upon the response to
her plan at the 1970 Lusaka Conference of Nonaligned Na-
tions and at the Singapore Meeting in January, however, she
thought that most nations agreed the principle of freedom
of the high seas was unequally "weighted in favor of the
interest of the dominant user nations" and that she would
be able to force a modification of this principle "to ac-
commodate the needs and realities of the world today." [23]
The consensus of nonaligned nations did not extend to
the entire body of the U.N. General Assembly, however, and
the 1972 draft resolution met with a series of reserva-
tions . International law advocated freedom on the high
seas for all ships and few were willing to back the effort
of a group of states in any given region to "establish a
separate legal regime for the high seas in that
region." [24] There was concern that restrictions on
international commerce, fishing, installations of submarine
cables and pipeline, or even overflights would arise.
Other nations underscored the possible complications of
verification. And there were protests that the proposal
ignored bilateral and multilateral defense arrangements in




After the Sri Lanka resolution was modified to conform
with international law, the U.N. General Assembly adopted
it on 16 December 1971 by a vote of 61 to , with 55
abstentions. The adopted version had two provisions: The
first called on the great powers to consult with Indian
Ocean littoral states in order to halt escalation of great
power military presence in the area and to eliminate from
the Indian Ocean "all bases, military installations,
logistical supply facilities ,.. .nuclear weapons and weapons
of mass destruction and any manifestation of Great Power
military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the
context of Great Power rivalry." The second provision
called for consultations among littoral and hinterland
states, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, and
other major maritime nations to ensure that warships and
military aircraft would not use the Indian Ocean in any
manner which threatened the littoral and hinterland states .
Subject to these restrictions and to the principles of
international law, "the right to free and unimpeded use of
the zone by the vessels of all nations is unaf fected . " [25
]
Subsequent Indian Ocean zone of peace resolutions were
passed each year with an increasing number of nations
supporting the concept. But the votes of nuclear-weapon
powers (those at whom the resolutions were directed)




Table II. Record of the nuclear-weapon powers' votes on
U.N. General Assembly Resolution No. 3080 (Indian
Ocean as a zone of peace) 1973
China France USSR UK USA
Yes Abstaining Abstaining Abstaining Abstaining
Attempts by Ad Hoc Committees to define the boundaries of
the zone and to construct a universally acceptable dis-
armament plan threatened the fragile consensus of the
littoral nations. Thus little progress was made on the
matter, and the resolution remained an innocuous policy
that cost nothing to espouse or express sympathy with, that
could mean many things to different people and countries
,
that could exist with apparently conflicting policies
(i.e., bilateral security arrangements), and that was an
accepted element in the nonaligned philosophy. What had
become evident was that a stalemate had been reached which
would only be broken when the U.S. and U.S.S.R. sat down
and seriously negotiated bilateral naval force reductions
in the Indian Ocean.
C. NALT AND SUPERPOWER BASES: 1973-1980
Following the completion of its Diego Garcia communi-
cation station in the spring of 1973, the United States
signed a new agreement, announced in the British House of
Commons on 5 February 1974, providing for the establishment
of U.S. support installations on Diego Garcia for warships
23

and aircraft. Proposed U.S. plans included lengthening the
airstrip from 8,000 to 12,000 feet; increasing the fuel
storage capacity from 60,000 to 380,000 barrels of aviation
fuel, and 320,000 barrels of fuel oil for ships; expanding
the airfield parking area and adding a limited aircraft
maintenance and repair facility; dredging the lagoon so it
would be able to handle a dozen ships , rather than just two
or three; and improving the existing quarters to accomodate
over 600 personnel . [27
]
Fulfillment of the plan would enable the U.S. to con-
tinuously operate a carrier task force in the Indian Ocean.
The lengthened runway would be suitable for KC-135
refueling aircraft, strategic bombers, or the deployment of
a long-range maritime patrol squadron.
After several months of debate, which included consid-
eration of a unanimous policy statement opposing the con-
struction of further facilities at Diego Garcia by 30
Indian Ocean states (signed 17 November 1974), the British
Government agreed to the United States' proposals for
facility expansion on 3 December 1974.
1 . The Congressional Battle
Questions concerning the expansion of Diego Garcia
had not confined themselves to London. Between 1973 and
1979, the President and the U.S. Senate battled continu-
ously over the definition of U.S. interests in the Indian
Ocean. The Senate refused to fund the Navy's expansion
24

plans in 1973, and gave approval in 1974 on the condition
that the project be subject to only a one-house veto. In
1975 President Ford confirmed his intention to proceed with
plans to upgrade the facility, but another obstacle was
created 22 March when Senator Edward M. Kennedy submitted
Senate Resolution 117 on behalf of himself, Senator Jacob
Javits , and Senator Claiborne Pell. This resolution called
on the President to postpone improvements on Diego Garcia
until he had attempted direct negotiations with the Soviets
aimed at achieving mutual limitations on facilities and
force levels in the Indian Ocean. [28]
A subsequent amendment to the $3.6 billion military
construction bill by Senator John Culver withheld the $13.6
million allotment for the Deigo Garcia facility until 1
July 1976, at which time the President was to report the
status of negotiations with the Soviet Union in naval arms
limitation talks for the Indian Ocean. [29] The delay in
the release of these funds was later shortened when a
House-Senate Conference on the Culver Amendment modified it
by requiring the President to report on the status of talks
with the Soviets by April 15. [30]
Senate Resolution 117 and the Culver Amendment
represented the continuing momentum in Congress to curb
overseas military forces and bases in the wake of the
Vietnam war. In exercising "the power of the purse," the
Culver Amendment reaffirmed the Senate's ability to
25

restrict Executive freedom by attaching riders to
authorizing and appropriating bills. [31] More importantly,
both acts highlighted Washington's fragmented foreign
policy consensus. The containment doctrine had crumbled,
and its replacement drifted amongst sentiment in favor of
reducing the amount of U.S. political and military
involvement with the rest of the world, voices stressing
the possibilities of East-West detente in an "era of
negotiations," and balance of power theorists seeking the
modernization of America's strategic and conventional
forces. Although the Senate never questioned America's
need for free sealanes, and rejected the concept of special
legal regimes in specific regions of the world, [32] it
continued to question the national interest in modernizing
Diego Garcia until long after Jimmy Carter assumed the
presidency of the United States.
2. The Garter Initiative
President Garter brought an unorthodox open negoti-
ating style to Washington which, when combined with a
forceful stand on human rights and early Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT II) disagreements over the American
cruise missile and the Soviet Backfire bomber, confused and
angered the Soviet negotiating team. When Congressional
criticism of Mr. Garter's foreign policies augmented that
of the Soviets, the President sought to entice Moscow into
an agreement on some less thorny issue than strategic arms
26

control to improve the negotiating atmosphere and demon-
strate his administration's good faith. Several proposals
were forwarded to the Soviets, including demilitarization
of the Indian Ocean, a ban on arming satellites, a compre-
hensive nuclear test ban treaty, and advance notification
of missile tests. Mr. Carter implied that these issues
were those on which there was some accord and which could
quickly result in agreement--thus paving the way for more
difficult negotiations on strategic arms. [33]
Addressing the U.N. General Assembly on 17 March
1977, President Carter re-emphasized his interest in "mu-
tual military restraint in the Indian Ocean." [34] He also
mentioned the matter in his opening statement at a 24 March
news conference
.
[35] The Soviets accepted Mr. Carter's
challenge later the same day. Speaking in Tanzania, Soviet
President Nokolai V. Podgorny indicated his country was
prepared "to open talks with the United States and other
concerned nations on the question of declaring the Indian
Ocean a zone of peace." Podgorny dampened hopes for a
quick resolution, however, when he stated "the key ques-
tion" in preserving peace in the area was "the elimination
of imperialist bases". [36]
The stage was thus set for negotiations, but there
was still some question of what was being sought by each
side. Podgorny ' s reference to "imperialist bases" could
refer to Diego Garcia, could be expanded to encompass U.S.
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facilities in Bahrain and Australia, or could even encom-
pass the British and French depots. While Podgorny was
vague concerning what constituted an "imperialist base", he
was very clear about Soviet facilities in Somalia--" the
Soviet Union," he stated, "does not maintain any bases in
the Indian Ocean or have any intention of establishing
them." [37] In short, talks were necessary to determine the
negotiating agenda and define the vocabulary of each
negotiating team.
On 30 March, Mr. Carter reported that negotiations
in Moscow between Secretary of State Vance and Soviet
leaders had established a study group to "discuss terms by
which we might demilitarize or reduce the military effort
in the Indian Ocean. "[38] Although the President implied a
reduction, the American proposal at the first session was
for "stabilizing" the presence of bases, ships and air-
craft. The United States thereby avoided the question of
what constituted a base and offered to freeze the status
quo. Under this plan each side would be permitted to
maintain its existing fleets and patterns of operation.
The U.S. Navy could retain its expanded base on Diego
Garcia, and in return, the Soviet Navy could continue using
facilities at the Somali port of Berbera--including the air
base, floating drydock and missile storage site. [39]
At first Moscow opposed the stabilization concept,
because it still allowed the U.S. the flexibility to deploy
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ballistic missile submarines and carrier-based aircraft
into the region. But in the second round of talks in the
fall of 1977, Moscow appeared ready to accept several
elements of the freeze. At the U.N., Moscow indicated that
a provisional agreement "freezing" the military activities
in the area, if reached, should be followed by talks on a
drastic reduction of military activities there, including
the dismantling of foreign bases. [40] The U.S. agreed in
principle, and toward the end of 1977, the two sides had
virtually consented not to increase their force levels
while working toward a reduction . [41 ]
3. The Break-Up of NALT
When Somalia's Said Barre ordered the July 1977
invasion of the Ogaden with Soviet-supplied weapons in
pursuit of irredentist claims and against Moscow's wishes,
the Soviet Union began to lose its grip on the Berbera
facility. Soviet-Somali relations became progressively
cooler when Moscow stepped up its aid to Ethiopia in late
August and ceased arms deliveries to Somalia in raid-
October. In November 1977, President Said Barre uni-
laterally abrogated the 1974 Soviet-Somali Friendship and
Cooperation Treaty and expelled the Soviets from the
country. [42
]
Having lost its primary naval base in the Indian
Ocean, the Soviets were no longer interested in an arrange-
ment with the U.S. which froze the status quo, and they
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said as much to the U.S. NALT team. [43] In the meantime,
they sought a "bargaining chip" to replace Berbera. Their
search first Led them to existing bases which had been
constructed by former colonial powers. They offered $1
million to lease Gan , an island located 400 miles north of
Diego Garcia, claiming the former British air base would
only be used as a supply station for fishing vessels. Amir
Ibrahim Nasir, President of the Maldives, was unconvinced,
and rejected the Soviet bid in late 1977. [44] Soon
afterward the Soviets tried to acquire Diego Suarez , a base
that France had evacuated in northern Madagascar when the
island became independent in 1975. Though heavily reliant
on Soviet military advisors and plagued with tribal con-
flicts and widespread food shortages. President Didier
Ratsiraka refused to relinquish the port's sovereignty to a
foreign military power. [45]
Finding a substitute for Berbera for the purpose of
resuming NAL negotiations, however, was only a secondary
Soviet concern. Foremost in Moscow's political strategy
was to avoid losing its new client, Ethiopia, and its
geographic position between Africa and the Middle East. [46]
Following the expulsion from Somalia, therefore, the Soviet
Union began massive air- and sea-lifts of material to
Ethiopia on 29 November. In order to airlift its supplies:
the Soviets found it necessary to employ a wide variety
of flight routes, to abuse the Montreux Convention's
provisions for overflights through Turkish air
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corridors , to engage widely in such subterfuges as
listing false final destinations and, on one occasion,
to substitute military transports for the civilian




Due to congestion at the port of Assab (Ethiopia) and
vulnerable supply lines from Assab to the Ethiopian front,
Moscow chose to use tank landing ships for sealift. These
lightly armed vessels required surface escorts , and forced
the Soviets to increase the number of their naval units to
the highest level ever maintained in the Indian Ocean. At
the same time, 13,000 Cuban troops were brought into
Ethiopia to assume a direct role in the fighting. [48]
In light of these events, the U.S. Government,
claiming that the Soviet naval buildup at the height of the
war cast doubt upon Moscow's sincerity and interest in
Indian Ocean naval limitations, suspended the talks after
the fourth round in February 1978. [49] At this final
negotiating session, Paul Warnke , the Director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency and head of the U.S. Delega-
tion, told Moscow that subsequent negotiations would be
linked to Soviet actions on the Horn of Africa. [50]
Following the suspension of the naval arms limita-
tion talks, both superpowers stepped up their activities in
the Indian Ocean. In March 1978, the Cubans continued
their offensive against the Somalis in the Ogaden , while
the Soviets reluctantly joined the Ethiopians in quelling
the guerrillas in Eritrea. Moscow also brought about 2,000
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advisors and technicians into the Horn from other East
European countries to assist in the military and ideologi-
cal training of the police, militia, regular armed forces
and youth groups. The presence of these personnel from the
Warsaw Pact nations of East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary,
Poland and Czechoslovakia contributed to Moscow's attempt




In June 1978, Moscow became the beneficiary of a
coup in South Yemen after efforts to enlarge lines of
communication with Washington and Beijing triggered a
takeover by a pro-Moscow faction of its Marxist govern-
ment. [52] With the return of a measure of stability to
Ethiopia and the windfall in Aden, the Soviets more or less
made up for their loss in Somalia through access to support
facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen. The Soviet Indian
Ocean squadron gained access to facilities at Socotra, a
South Yemeni island in the Arabian Sea, and began building
up bases on Perim and the Dahlak Archipelago-- islands
belonging to Ethiopia. Subsequent transfer of a floating
drydock from Aden to Dahlak Island has enabled the Soviets
to convert this site into a major ship repair facility .[ 53
]
In July 1978, Moscow obtained access to facilities
in Cam Rahn Bay following a Sino-Vietnamese split on Kam-
puchean policy. This access, while limited, is particu-
larly important to the Soviets, because it is the only port
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available for forward basing between Vladivostok and the
Persian Gulf. Furthermore, Cam Rahn Bay's position enables
the Soviets to monitor traffic transiting through the South
China Sea.
On 27 December 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanis-
tan in order to prop up the last vestiges of a pro-Moscow
leadership in Kabul. While the ultimate intentions of
Moscow in this county still remain unclear, Soviet control
of Afghanistan's airfields and aviation facilities enables
the Soviets to counter-balance the air power of U.S.
carrier task, forces deployed in the Indian Ocean.
The U.S., for its part, has moved ahead with im-
provement of Diego Garcia and construction of a Rapid
Deployment Force which can be deployed to the Persian Gulf
on two-weeks' notice. After the overthrow of the Shah of
Iran in January 1979, the U.S. sought to broaden its sup-
port of regional powers
,
particularly the "regional inf lu-
entials," National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's
term for those nations in the process of acquiring consi-
derable power which might be relied upon to resist Soviet
advances
.
[54] These countries include Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
and Australia.
The U.S. also strengthened its ties with China.
Although many of their policies are diametrically opposed,
Western and Chinese interests intersect on checking Soviet
support for particular guerrilla groups in southern Africa,
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providing Pakistan with help against possible pressure from
Soviet-supported Afghanistan and blocking the emergence of
an Indochina dominated by a Moscow-backed Vietnam. [55 J
In addition, assistance and cooperation agreements
involving American use of bases have recently been signed
with Australia, Bahrain, Kenya, Somalia and Oman; while
Egypt, Sudan and Israel, with access to the Red Sea, have
declared their readiness to let American forces use bases
under certain circumstances
.
[56 j Should U.S. forces be
deployed to the Sinai in the near future to fulfill Camp
David peace-keeping functions, the U.S. stands to gain
access to even more tangible assets in Southwest Asia.
Even as the two superpowers were negotiating new
base rights and improving their abilities to project and
sustain forces in the Indian Ocean, the Carter Administra-
tion sought to lessen competition through communication.
Testifying before a House Armed Services Committee panel in
October 1978, Leslie H. Gelb, Director of the State Depart-
ment's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, indicated that
Soviet naval forces had returned to routine levels and that
the administration was considering whether to resume the
Indian Ocean negotiations broken off in February. Gelb
said the subject had been broached in discussions between
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Soviet Minister Andrei
Gromyko during the latter ' s visit to New York in August.
Gelb went on to assure House members that American
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interests--def ined as procecting the oil lifeline, guarding
U.S. friends in Che area, and conveying an appreciation of
the growing economic potential of countries in the region--
would not be jeopardized by the stabilization agreement.
The arrangement, he said, would still
...permit periodic deployments of U.S. Navy task forces
in the Indian Ocean; maintain a Navy facility at Diego
Garcia ,... allow participation in joint military
exercises with allied forces in the region, and allow
both routine transit and port calls in countries of the
Indian Ocean littoral . [57
]
Between October 1978 and May 1979, however, the
Indian Ocean negotiations were pre-empted by the talks they
had originally been designed to facili tate--SALT II.
Despite solicitations from Asian and African nations for
the resumption of demilitarization negotiations between the
two superpowers, it was not until May 1979, when the SALT
II agreements were completed, that the U.S. was again able
to focus attention on NALT. The topic was placed on the
agenda for June , during the Brezhnev-Carter summit in
Vienna to sign the SALT II treaty. [58]
But prior to the June summit the Administration
failed to gain a consensus to continue talks. Sharp divi-
sions had arisen within the Carter Administration regarding
the benefits of a naval agreement with Moscow while over
10,000 Cuban troops and 1,000 Soviet and East German advi-
sors remained in Ethiopia. The Soviets had consolidated
relations with Addis Ababa by concluding a Friendship and
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Cooperation treaty 20 November 1978 which included a call
for consistent policies opposing U.S. expansionism, thereby
having clear anti-Somali overtones .[ 59 ] The domestic
situations in Afghanistan and Iran were also causes for
concern. Instability in Afghanistan had led to the death
of the American Ambassador in February 1979--the same month
that armed guerrillas attacked the U.S. embassy in Tehran
and held Ambassador Sullivan and 100 staff members hostage
for two hours--and suspicion of Soviet aspirations within
the region was building.
Outside the Carter Administration, the climate of
distrust was even more pronounced. Foreign policy ana-
lysts , members of Congress and the Senate , and Pentagon
spokesmen were joining ranks to challenge Mr. Carter's
ability to negotiate with the Soviet Union. The Presi-
dent's refusal to react to the continuing Soviet and Cuban
activities in Angola, a hands-off attitude during the Horn
of Africa conflict, and retreat on the issue of a Soviet
combat brigade in Cuba brought foreign policy critics
together with military interests which questioned the
President's cancellation of the B-1 bomber, veto of a new
attack carrier, decision not to build the neutron bomb
(after pressuring European leaders to publicly accept it at
some cost in terms of their own political standing)
,
and
concessions on a whole host of issues connected with the
SALT II agreements. [60]
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Besieged by such cricicism, Che President concen-
trated upon ushering the SALT II accords through Congress.
Over the objections of nonaligned nations in the Indian
Ocean, further naval arms limitation talks were tabled, and
remained there through the completion of Mr. Carter's term
in office. Any Administration hopes of reviving the issue
were abandoned after the November 1979 seizure of the U.S.
embassy in Tehran and the December invasion of Afghanistan
by the Soviet Union. Instead, the Administration struggled
to avoid being overwhelmed by events which seemed beyond
control. Despite diplomatic pleas, legal admonishment,
economic coercion, and the deployment of three aircraft
carrier task forces to the Indian Ocean, the hostages were
not released. Similarly, almost unanimous condemnation in
the U.N. General Assembly and a boycott of the 1980 Summer
Ol3rmpic Games in Moscow notwithstanding, the Soviets re-
mained in Afghanistan. If anything, the area grew even
more bellicose in September 1980 when Iraqi troops stormed
into Iran to renew Baghdad's claim of the Shatt-al-Arab
River and to respond to Iranian calls for rebellion by
Iraq's Shi ' i majority.
An environment had emerged wherein further negoti-
ations with the Soviets to create a "zone of peace" in the
Indian Ocean became certain political suicide. And Jimmy
Garter, no longer backed by the advocates of detente who
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had flourished in Washington four years earlier, chose to
let the issue die a silent death.
D. ADDITIONAL DELAYS AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE: 1981
Testifying before the Subcommittee on International
Security and Scientific Affairs on 23 March 1981, Richard
Burt, Director of the State Department's Bureau of
Politico-Military Affairs , described the prospects for arms
control initiatives as dismal. Pointing to the ongoing
occupation of Afghanistan, Burt stated: "for the foresee-
able future the Soviets are not prepared to negotiate arms
control measures for the Indian Ocean area in good
faith. "[61 J Multilateral efforts under the auspices of the
U.N., he went on, were even less likely of success than
bilateral negotiations:
Some regional states want to exclude the superpowers
;
[62] others want to ensure that their stronger regional
neighbors are never in a position to dominate them.
But Burt assured the subcommittee the U.S. would continue
to work with the U.N.'s Ad Hoc Committee to define a set of
principles for the Indian Ocean region on which all could
agree .
Burt's testimony, however, only indicates some of
problems surrounding multilateral progress. In February
1980, for instance, the Soviets pushed for the admission of
the GDR, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia to the
Committee on the Indian Ocean. When this was blocked by
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the United States and several other NATO countries, the
Soviets sought their admission on the ground that they made
"extensive use of the waters of the Indian Ocean" and
wanted "to make their contribution to the turning of the
Indian Ocean into a zone of peace." [63]
Tension also arose in 1981 when, focusing upon the
occupation of Afghanistan, the U.S., its allies, and China
opposed plans to convene the 1981 Colombo conference.
During the discussion the U.S. noted a large build-up of
Soviet forces in Soviet Central Asia. Nonetheless, at the
February-March session in New York, the nonaligned nations
proposed holding an August conference in Colombo and sub-
mitted a draft agenda. Their outline included a discussion
of the political situation in the Indian Ocean region, the
principles and aspects of the problem and a series of steps
to transform the region into a zone of peace. As a conces-
sion to Soviet objections, the non-aligned nations dropped
the subject of "rivalry between the great powers" from the
program. [64] Moscow, which has always demanded that a
distinction be made between the Soviet Union's objectives
in the region and those of the imperialist powers
,
was
satisfied; but Western representatives were not. The
latter stated again that as long as Soviet forces remained
in Afghanistan, the atmosphere was not conducive for a
multilateral conference. Sri Lanka's representative and




concurred, stating that the conference would "merely be a
forum for propaganda while Soviet forces remain in Afghan-
istan and revolutionary uncertainty holds sway in Iran. [65]
In June 1981 these polemics continued. U.S. delegate
Philip Wilcox labeled Soviet descriptions of an American
naval threat as an attempt to divert attention from
Moscow's occupation of Afghanistan. Australia's Perry
Nolan agreed, and added that Soviet support for the Vietna-
mese invasion of Kampuchea was equally destabilizing and
fostered further suspicion of Moscow's strategic motives.
The Western view was summarized in West Germany's draft
resolution, which again recommended an indefinite delay
"until the region's political and security climate is more
propitious ." [ 66
]
Opposing Western appeals for delay, the Soviet Union
focused on the two U.S. aircraft carrier task forces and
improvements to the Diego Garcia complex. Soviet repre-
sentative Lev Mendelevich emphasized Moscow's intention to
respond to threats to its security, and to compete as an
equal superpower in every region of the world, including
the Indian Ocean. [67]
In an attempt to side-step East-West friction, Abdul
Halim of Malaysia offered the nonaligned nations' three-
point plan for achieving a zone of peace within the region.
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(1) The withdrawal of ail foreign forces;
(2) Agreement among the region's states that they will
settle disputes peacefully, and
(3) An understanding between the regional states and
the big powers that the latter will not use force
against the former and that the Indian Ocean





The final outcome of the June conference , however , was
the cancellation of the international congress scheduled to
take place on Colombo in the summer of 1981 . Though plans
are still tentative, the conference has now been pushed
back, to mid-1983. Two meetings have been proposed in 1982
to plan the conference and prepare a report to the U.N.
General Assembly conference on disarmament . But the un-
derlying schisms which caused the 1981 postponement remain,
and hopes for consensus on a future conference, much less a




III. THE SOVIET PRESENCE
In the international section of Leonid Brezhnev's
February 1981 address to the 26th Party Congress, the
General Secretary gave undisputed priority to the peace
issue. In particular, Mr. Brezhnev proposed a Soviet-
American summit, a moratorium on the introduction of new
theatre nuclear weapons in Europe, and the creation of
zones of peace, especially in the Indian Ocean. [1] This
chapter will examine the last issue, Soviet interests in
the region, Moscow's motivations for favoring such a pro-
posal, and other Soviet initiatives in the Asian theatre.
Differences between Moscow's peace zone formula and the
U.N. General Assembly resolution will be noted, along with
the effects of either proposal on the West's ability to
protect its interests in the Indian Ocean. Finally, this
chapter will demonstrate that Moscow desires to place the
responsibility for failures to reach a settlement squarely
on the shoulders of the U.S., and thus enhance its image as
an advocate of regional causes .
A. SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
In August 1981
,
an article in Moscow's International
Affairs by A. Ladozhsky outlined several Soviet national
interests in the Indian Ocean:
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First of all, the U.S.S.R has a stake in preventing the
appearance of a strategic threat to Tt from the
southern direction. It is no secret that dozens of
planes based on American aircraft carriers in the
Persian Gulf have a wide range of operation and can
carry nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, just as all
littoral and hinterland countries, is interested in the
safety of sea routes passing through the Indian Ocean
because they not only link, the U.S.S.R. with the
littoral states but are also the only year-round sea
route linking the European part of the U.S.S.R. with
its Far Eastern ports
.
In that area the U.S.S.R. conducts important work
connected with space exploration and is also engaged In
research which is a part ot its study o f the World
Ocean .
In addition, the Soviet Union also has political
interests in the Indian Ocean area where there are
dozens ol states which have recently become free from
colonial domination. The U.S.S.R. supported the
peoples of these countries in their struggle for
independence. It supports them now, too, in their
struggle against imperialism, hegemonism, neo-
colonialism and racism (emphasis mine). [2]
Ladozhsky's article is remarkable because it stresses
concerns which are common to the Soviet Union and the
littoral states. An April 1981 interview[3] was less cau-
tious in its approach. At that time, Yuri Velikano, a
diplomat in the Seychelles, emphasized Moscow's desire to
secure its "own maritime and fishing areas", support Afri-
can "liberation movements", and protect itself against U.S.
ballistic missile submarines.
Ladozhsky fails to mention self-serving pursuits such
as Soviet fishing, which has caused some friction within
the region over the past decade. Instead, he attempts to
place the Soviet Union squarely in the littoral camp:
Two lines are clearly seen in the discussion of the
question of the peace zone in the Indian Ocean. The
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Soviet Union favours a decision that would promote
peace and security, and the interests not only of the
U.S.S.R. but also of the countries of the Indian Ocean .
The United States on the other hand, having declared
this area a "spheireof it_s__vj^t_aj^ interests , i_s_
pursuing a "line that is "Hiametr ically opposed to the
very concept of the peace zone (emphasis mine). [4]
The change in Soviet rhetoric is due to increasing criti-
cism from many of the littoral powers about great power
rivalry in the Indian Ocean. These states rarely make any
distinction between non-littoral intruders--a situation
which clearly disturbs Moscow, and which has led to a
propaganda barrage against such comparisons. Yet
Ladozhsky's list, because of its "united front" approach,
neglects to mention other important reasons for the Soviet
naval presence. I have therefore chosen to summarize the
economic, political and military interests of the Soviet
Union in the Indian Ocean, and have briefly commented,




Gaining experience of sailing in distant waters
under different climatic conditions and training in
escorting cargo ships--a legitimate function of all
navies. This training JLncludes command, control
and communications (C ) testing, hydrographic
research, and bathymetric mapping.
(2) Indian Ocean fishing. Fish products provide one
third of the animal protein in the Soviet diet and
one fifth of all protein. A naval presence deters
the seizure or harassment of Soviet trawlers
.
(3) Seaborne support of various space events.
(4) A sea route through the Indian Ocean for the
movement of goods between the east and west coasts
of the U.S.S.R. The Trans-Siberian railroad
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reached its saturation point in 1972 (when the Suez
was closed) and a second overland systera--the
Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAiM) railway--is not yet
complete. The northern sea route through the
Arctic Ocean is only open a few months of the year.
(5) Observation of, or influence in, prospective
political and military changes in the Persian Gulf,
a body of water that lies close to Russian missile
and outer space industries located in Central Asia.
(6) Interest in oil and other minerals adjacent to or
underneath parts of the Indian Ocean. In parti-
cular, the Soviets seek an equal opportunity to
exploit these resources and to compete for offshore
concessions from littoral states.
(7) Deterring the presence of Polaris, Poseidon, or
Trident submarine- launched ballistic missile
operations in the Arabian Sea.
(8) Gaining a foothold in the area by taking advantage
of the West's mistakes, or, at a minimum,
preventing the West from exercising unfettered
influence in the area. This includes naval
demonstrations to prove that Moscow must be
consulted in crises, while (by having no permanent
"bases" and no large permanent combatant presence)
avoiding the political and economic costs generally
associated with regional deployments
.
(9) Preparing for the advent of Chinese ballistic
missiles, aboard naval ships or submarines, aimed
at the Soviet Union.
(10) Economic and political advertisement of advanced
socialist technology and the success of the Soviet
socialist system.
(11) Providing arms, technicians, and advisors to local
governments. A naval presence can support arms
transfers and serves to insure the safety of Soviet
citizens acting in advisory roles.
(12) Providing Soviet protection. A Soviet "umbrella"
fosters greater self-defense and can augment




One of the most contentious articles from this list is
the threat posed by submarine launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) . The Soviets frequently mention the ability of
U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) missiles
to strike the Soviet Union from the Indian Ocean, and even
go so far as to exaggerate the ranges of these weapons
.
Yuri Velikanov, in his April interview, for instance,
stated that U.S. "missiles from submarines in this ocean
can reach any part of the Soviet Union". [5 j Clearly, the
Polaris (2,500 nautical miles) and Poseidon (2,880 nautical
miles) do not have this range. But the mention of this
capability has often been translated into American use of
this ocean for its ballistic missile submarine fleet by the
littoral nations.
To date , Washington has never admitted such a deploy-
ment and Moscow has never accused the U.S. of posing such
a threat--only in having the capability
.
[6 ] Indeed, the
lack of submarine tender, navigation, and communications
support in the Indian Ocean, as well as the amount of time
required to transit from the submarine base in Guam to an
area in the ocean that would place Soviet targets within
range of SLBMs makes Soviet rhetoric seem ludicrous
.[ 7
]
One explanation for Moscow's continuous emphasis on
strategic capabilities is that it constitutes a warning:
I do not think we can entirely dismiss Soviet
anxieties on this score as dissimulation to justify
their own presence. They may well be legitimate. It
46

is even possible that their present relatively modest
deployment in the Indian Ocean was in part intended as
an earnest to the United States that if we did initiate
regular patrols, the competition would be hot and
heavy. If so, we should take them at their word.
There is probably no easier way to get Russian ships
steaming all over the Indian Ocean than to introduce a
strategic threat. [8]
As in the past, however, there is no incentive to place
U.S. SLBMs in the Indian Ocean at a future date. The range
of the Poseidon missile precludes its future deployment
into the region. Only the 4,000-mile range Trident mis-
sile, would make such deployment feasible. The 1975 SIPRI
Yearbook, in fact, goes so far as to proclaim that the
"U.S. Navy now intends to deploy ballistic missile sub-
marines in the Indian Ocean more frequently in the future
as vessels equipped with somewhat longer-range missiles
than those carried by earlier versions enter service. "[9]
The SIPRI Yearbook gave no source for this declaration,
however, and made no effort to explain why newer-generation
submarines would want to nullify their longer ranges with
trips around South Africa or Australia--trips which would
take them outside of effective firing range. In short,
though a future deployment of SLBM platforms would evoke a
Soviet response , this is not the reason for present Soviet
levels in the Indian Ocean.
B. MOTIVATIONS FOR FAVORING A ZONE OF PEACE
The main reason the Soviet Navy is present in the
region is because other non-littoral navies are present. A
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review of the list of Soviet interests in the area will
reveal every one could be fulfilled with passage of a zone
of peace resolution which respected the Law of the Sea
agreements. Ladozhsky acknowledged this fact in his Inter-
national Relations article:
The Soviet Union does not have any interests or aims in
the region that would necessitate its military
presence, but this presupposes mutuality on the part of
other non-littoral states. [10]
This statement underscores what several Americans have been
saying for years. In his 1979 work on the Soviet Navy, for
instance, Robert Bathurst wrote:
The Soviets are not obviously changing the correlation
of forces in the Indian Ocean , for the price is to be
able to strike at industrial Europe and Japan through
the weakest link, oil. As these goals can be achieved
more easily through the air and by land, however, it is
likely that the Soviet Navy will not have a major role
here. [11 ]
Testifying before the Subcommittee on International Securi-
ty and Scientific Affairs in March 1981, Richard Burt re-
iterated this theme when questioned about Moscow's position
on Indian Ocean arms limitation talks:
On the superpower level, Soviet arms control initia-
tives apply only to naval forces. This would do a good
job of limiting U.S. military presence in the region--
since the preponderance of our forces are naval--while
leaving the massive Soviet land presence, Afghanistan,
and Soviet military involvement in and assistance to
regional states completely out of the picture. [12]
What both of these men are saying, and what is clear when
one analyzes Soviet statements about the "zone of peace"
is that Moscow would prefer not to have to maintain an
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armada wichin the Indian Ocean. A large naval presence in
the Indian Ocean is expensive to maintain, difficult to
service and vulnerable in wartime. Reinforcements from
Pacific ports have to travel thousands of miles along
unfriendly coastlines, while ships from the Black, Baltic
and North Seas transit long routes through narrow straits
and canals
.
The U.S. faces an equally challenging problem but has
no other options. Although this is changing as the U.S.
acquires the use of air and land facilities in some lit-
toral nations, the U.S. Navy still remains the predominant
means of guaranteeing the security of regional sea lanes.
Historically, the Soviet Union has been trying since
1955 to break, through the Western cordon in South Asia. By
1964 it had succeeded in making its political presence felt
in almost all the Indian Ocean states, but the Soviets
lacked naval power in the area, even on the eve of the U.S.
task force entry in 1964.
Probably the U.S.S.R., till that time, thought that the
Indian Ocean did not pose a strategic nuclear threat to
its security. And, even if the U.S.S.R. was aware of
that threat, inadequate naval capacity prevented the
U.S.S.R. from operating a naval fleet in the Indian
Ocean at the time .[13]
Soviet naval capacity increased gradually, and its presence
on the high seas was also gradual. As oilers, supply
vessels and more modern, powerful, ocean-going ships were
added to the fleet in the 1960's, the Soviets began to
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operate in the Baltic, the North Sea and the Atlantic, and
then gradually made their presence felt in the Mediter-
ranean Sea and the Pacific Ocean. [14] The first Soviet
deployment to the Indian Ocean was not until 1968.
In 1981 the Soviet Union maintained 21 ships in the
Indian Ocean, and most of these were noncombatants not
equitable to the two aircraft carrier task forces the
United States deployed to the area following the invasion
of Afghanistan .[ 1 5 ] Up until the withdrawal of one carrier
task force in November 1981, the U.S. Navy maintained
nearly 32 combat and support vessels in the region. [16J In
November this was reduced to 25 U.S. ships. As was demon-
strated in the course of the American hostage crisis from
1979-1981, however, naval power has limited applications
when not employed in concert with ground and air forces
.
Even when all military forces are combined, there are
nationalist, cultural, political and economic factors to be
overcome, as the United States learned in Vietnam, and the
Soviets are learning in Afghanistan.
Thus, with or without a naval presence in the Indian
Ocean, the Soviet Union will still have the ability to
bring the onus of its military forces to bear upon the
region. By affirming its readiness to negotiate naval
force reductions, the U.S.S.R. is attempting to gain the
support of the nonaligned movement to bring the U.S. to the
bargaining table. The Soviets realize that the U.S. is
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clearly in a no-win situation; whether America agrees to a
freeze, a reduction of its presence or the elimination of
bases, it would be negotiating away its ability to deter
Moscow's military pressure on the region.
The Soviet approach to making the Indian Ocean into a
"zone of peace" is consistent with Soviet negotiations on
arms limitations in other areas , including strategic wea-
pons , theatre nuclear weapons, and mutual-balanced force
reductions (MBFR) in Europe. Speaking before the 31st U.N.
General Assembly, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko
stated :
We consider it reasonable that a number of Asian and
African states desire to turn the Indian Ocean into a
zone of peace. In this connection, the essential point
is that there should be no foreign military bases in
the area which constitute the main element of a
permanent military presence. As for the Soviet Union,
it has never had and does not have any intention of
building military bases in the Indian Ocean.
In solving the problem of foreign military bases
along these lines, the Soviet Union is prepared,
together with other Powers , to seek ways of reducing on
a reciprocal basis the military activities of non-
coastal States in the Indian Ocean and the regions
directly adjacent thereto. Our country has shown its
readiness to contribute to the realization of the idea
of turning it into a zone of peace, but of course, this
should not create any obstacles to the freedom of
navigation or scientific research in the Indian Ocean.
If due account is taken of our approach by the States
concerned, the Soviet Union will be able to participate
in consultations on matters relating to preparations
for convening an international conference on the Indian
Ocean. [17]
Mr. Gromyko ' s 1976 speech begins by supporting the gist of
the nonaligned nations' proposal, but is quick to add the
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Soviet view of where the real problem lies--i.e. "foreign
military bases which constitute the main element of a
permanent military presence." This same point was made
when President Podgorny, speaking in Tanzania on 24 March
1977, said "the key question of preserving peace... is the
elimination of ... imperialist military bases. "[18] Each of
these speakers subsequently went to great pains to empha-
size that no Soviet facility in the Indian Ocean could be
classified as a military base; that the Soviets were simply
visiting littoral-nation ports at the invitation of host-
country governments .
Although the attempt to clarify just what constitutes a
"base" appears moot, it is an important part of the Soviet
attempt to place the greater portion of regional political
pressure upon the U.S. The Soviets realize that sponsors
of the zone of peace movement
,
if forced to choose which
situation they find most distasteful- -bases under the
control of littoral nations or bases which represent in-
dependent sovereign terr
i
tory--will find the second
condition least acceptable. After establishing Diego
Garcia as a non-littoral facility, the Soviets feel free to
declare geographical privilege because of a special moral
status
.
The second half of Mr. Gromyko ' s 1976 speech further
illustrates the quasi-legal nature of the Soviet nego-
tiating style. Although the Soviets support the zone of
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peace concept, Chere are certain amendments which must be
made. These include "freedom of navigation" and "scien-
tific research". In essence, the Soviets are placing
conditions on what would constitute an acceptable zone of
peace proposal and their riders are little different from
those sought by Western powers--that is, any zone of peace
legislation must allow the free passage of all ships as
guaranteed in the Law of the Sea Conference. Only when
"due account" of the Soviet position is taken will the
Soviets be willing to consider an agreement with littoral
nations .
In short , the Soviet Union is attempting to focus the
national and regional energies of littoral nations upon the
one area of Soviet-Nonalignment agreement: the unsatis-
factory presence of the American base on Diego Garcia.
Once the Soviets dislodge the U.S. from Diego Garcia and
restrict the size of future U.S. naval contingents, the
zone of peace process is of limited utility. For this
reason, one can expect continued absentions by the Soviets
whenever the resolution comes to a vote in the U.N.
C. OTHER SOVIET INITIATIVES IN ASIA
It would be short-sighted, however, to view the Indian
Ocean aspirations of the Soviet Union merely in terms of a
single U.N. resolution. Soviet sympathy for the zone of
peace is closely entwined with Leonid Brezhnev's proposal
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for "a system of collective security in Asia,"[19J made in
his address to the International Meeting of Communist and
Worker's Parties at Moscow on 7 June 1969. As stated in a
1979 editorial in the Moscow weekly New Times entitled
"Asia Needs Security":
The U.S.S.R. views with understanding the idea, as
advanced by the countries in the region, that their
homeland should be made into a zone of peace... To
realize this idea, a collective quest for constructive
measures that would guarantee security, as well as
concerted action by the countries concerned, is
needed. [20]
The objective of this collective security system includes
promoting the Soviet Union as an Asian power, and, in turn,
selling itself as a protector of nationalist aspirations in
the region. But Soviet support of the collective security
plan , like the zone of peace proposals , serves Soviet
interests first. It is part of a security package aimed
solely at reducing the forces on or near its borders: first
by eliminating the U.S. presence; second, by isolating
other potential rivals (such as China); third, by engaging
in bilateral security pledges, and fourth, by encouraging
nonalignment when other options fail.
In the case of Soviet policy in South Asia, the Soviets
have promoted their country as an Asian nation, [21] in tune
with the aspirations of the regional states, and able to
serve regional interests better than the U.S. But attempts
to seek "regional solutions" are little more than proposals
to exclude American and Western European presence. The
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Chinese, who can also claim Asian standing, have been
diplomatically isolated by Soviet exclusion from the Asian
collective system, and through a system of bilateral Soviet
treaties with Afghanistan, Outer Mongolia, North Korea,
Vietnam, India, Iraq, South Yemen, and Syria. When bi-
lateral treaties prove beyond the reach of the Soviets,
then they prefer a state of nonalignment . Countries that
sign agreements with "non-regional" powers often find
themselves reminded of earlier Soviet pacts--as Izvestia
reminded its readers in 1978 that the Soviet-Iran Treaty of
1921, which permits Russian intervention under certain
circumstances, was still valid. [22]
In addition to the system of collective security in
Asia, the zone of peace resolution is part of an ongoing
competition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. for global
parity. Whether or not the Soviet Union wishes to deploy
naval forces to the Indian Ocean, the U.S. presence there
mandates a Soviet response. Vernon Aspaturian has des-
cribed this compulsion in terms of the Soviet quest to be
seen as a global equal with the U.S. in all aspects:
No state is entitled to be a global power .. .global
status .. .must 5e self -achieved , self -asserted
,
and
self -sustained . Likewise, no state is entitled to be
equal with any other state ... equality , as even Soviet
observers implicitly concede, is ascriptive in char-
acter and depends upon the recognition and policies of
others . [23 ]
Thus, while Washington perceived the SALT I agreements as
instruments designed to domesticate and contain Soviet
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power; the Soviets perceived it as a step up to global
equality with the U.S. Today the Soviets view U.S. "lec-
tures" on their behavior in the Horn of Africa, Afghani-
stan, and Vietnam as a refusal to treat the U.S.S.R. as an
equal. Moscow believes itself forced to respond to U.S.
deployments in the Indian Ocean to ensure its standing as
an equal power, even if its political interests are better
served by land and air forces. The Soviets, one could say,
find themselves in a "double bind" situation: although
aware of the fear expressed by littoral and oil-dependent
nations about their presence in the Indian Ocean, Moscow is
compelled to maintain a naval force in the region as long
as an American naval challenge exists . Failure to answer
the American presence (or conversely, American failure to
match the Soviet presence), would jeopardize superpower
standing
.
In summarizing the Soviet position in the Indian Ocean,
then, one can quote some of the same conclusions from
studies analyzing Soviet negotiations in Europe.
Soviet security is now assured by a costly effort to
maintain supremacy against all the U.S.S.R. 's
neighbors, as well as parity with the U.S. Over the
long term, however, Soviet security and the advance of
socialism would be better served by the establishment
of "peace zones" on the entire periphery of the
U.S.S.R. [24]
The Soviets
' long-term interest is not served by a
large presence in the Indian Ocean if a negotiated reduc-
tion would lead to the elimination of American forces on
56

its southern perimeter. The Soviets will therefore con-
tinue to press the U.S. to engage in Naval Arms Limitations
Talks, while coincidentally insisting on their inherent
right of "free passage" and "scientific research" within
the region. Although the Soviets recognize the political
gains from expressing support of the zone of peace pro-
posal, Moscow certainly intends to modify and apply the
concept to suit its own purposes. Removal of non-littoral
powers and greater independence for regional states is
welcomed by Moscow--but only as long as nations gravitate




IV. THE INDIAN POSITION
The history of United States foreign policy in South
Asia since partition of the subcontinent in 1947 has re-
flected, among other things, an aversion to Indian nation-
alism and stubborn adherence to the policy of containment.
Today, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the
fall of the Shah of Iran, the U.S. finds itself again
scrambling for a security system similar to the Baghdad
Pact, the Central Treaty Organization or even the Iran-
Saudi Arabia "twin pillar" arrangement. Reviving Dulles'
East-West approach to the region, the Reagan Administration
has chosen a strategy which moves the "second pillar" from
Tehran to Islamabad and reignites the spectre in New Delhi
of yet another challenge to Indian primacy on the
subcontinent
.
Understanding the failure of American policymakers to
adopt a more sophisticated multilateral approach, which is
better attuned to the political, economic and national
aspirations of regional powers and which defines "security"
in other than simply military terms, is best undertaken by
a review of traditional great power-lesser power rela-
tionships. George Liska, in a paper on the Third World,




(1) Great powers can treat and have reasons to treat
individual middle powers as regional rivals, and be
led to help still lesser states to contain theni
under the pretense of restraining, unilaterally or
cooperatively, all Third World conflict; or
(2) They can regard them as regional allies in contests
with other great powers and proceed to reinforce
them competitively, possibly as a means to
reapportionment by way of reclientization ; and
(3) Finally, they can proceed either unilaterally or
jointly progressively to devolve regional
responsibilities to apparently constructively
disposed middle powers. [1]
Referring to Liska's list, Rouhollah Ramazani[2] has
noted that the great powers have traditionally followed a
combination of options 1 and 2 in their relations with
regional powers in the Indian Ocean. Following World War
II, the emergence of a rigid bipolar world based on compe-
tition and denial made the superpowers likely to charac-
terize regional powers as "pro-Western" or "anti-Western"
and fostered distrust of nonaligned nations which charac-
terized themselves as autonomous. This simplistic bipolar
view of global relationships lead the U.S. to make equally
naive judgements concerning its alliance partners. A
nation which entered a pro-Western alliance, such as CENTO,
was considered an American "friend," acting in the interest
of American ideology (containment) , and not in pursuit of
narrow national goals. The U.S. and its regional alliance
partners, however, sometimes had different interpretations
of what constituted a threat. Pakistan joined the Baghdad
Pact (later CENTO) in order to achieve military parity with
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India, not due to an incipient fear of communist hegemony.
Conversely, India sought to consolidate domestic factions
and pursue its destiny as an autonomous regional power, and
avoided military involvement with the U.S. until the 1962
border clashes with China. Through its own bipolar glas-
ses, the U.S. only saw these two South Asian powers as
proxy forces capable of detering Moscow and Peking:
The consistent strand running through the many twists
and turns of U.S. South Asian policy has been an
implicit view of both India and Pakistan as pawns in
the great power game. In the thinking of many American
officials, it was for the United States to decide
whether and how to utilize them for American purposes
or to checkmate their use by others. Thus, in the
Nixon attitude so widespread in 1954, cold war
priorities dictated strengthening Pakistan and
weakening India. Later, the objective shifted to
strengthening both India and Pakistan against China,
preserving an American-determined balance between them
for the sake of their common confrontation with Peking.
Finally, during the Bangladesh crisis,... Pakistan was
seen for all practical purposes as China's pawn and
India as the Soviet Union's, with the American interest
limited to making certain that neither Peking nor
Moscow had a "destablizing" monopoly of influence in
the subcontinent. The power of nationalism in both
South Asian countries was consistently underrated, in
this perspective, and the ability of the external
powers to manipulate regional power relationships
consistently exaggerated. [3 J
In short, the U.S. has consistently adhered to a policy
of containment while employing Liska's first two options
for great power-middle power relations. Rather than
fostering India's quest for regional power status and
devolving regional responsibilities which America inherited
in the wake of colonial retreat from the area after World
War II, America has clung tenaciously to a view of itself
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as the stabilizing force in the balance of power game,
filling a void which it believes regional powers neither
wish nor are able to fill. Rather than reviewing the
recommendations of leaders such as General Stilwell,
studying the White Paper on China, or analyzing the failure
of U.S. policy in Vietnam, America continues to promote
offensive paternalist policies of military, economic and
political dependence in the Third World, when political and
economic integration into an interdependent world order
would represent a more effective long-term alternative.
Strong economic and political powers , whose leaders govern
with the approval of their citizenry, represent the best
deterrence to the spread of communism, and ultimately the
best means of "containment." Had U.S. policymakers of the
40
' s and 50 ' s encouraged the transitional devolvement of
regional responsibilities to the littoral powers of the
Indian Ocean, rather than the divisive policies it promoted
instead, the security of the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf
regions might very well be stronger today. And, one might
add, the tragedies in China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia,
and the Indian subcontinent-- to name but a few instances--
might never have occurred. It is with this history in mind
that the chapter now turns to the foreign policy objectives
of India, how they have shaped India's relationship with




In a 1979 work on Soviet-Indian relations, Robert
Donaldson outlined India's five major foreign policy
obj ectives
:
(1) security from external military threat;
(2) secure independence, maintain nonalignment , and
avoid undue dependence on any one outside power;
(3) insulate the Indian Ocean from great power military
activity
;
(4) promote the maintenance of friendly (preferably
democratic) governments, free of outside
domination, in neighboring states; and
(5) receive material assistance on the most favorable
terms for economic development
.
[4]
In the following pages, my intent is to examine each of
these objectives and to note the degree of success (or
failure) India has had in meeting them. I shall also note,
where appropriate, the part that the Soviet Union plays in
promoting or preventing India's successful attainment of
these goals, and how the zone of peace resolution relates
to each.
A. SECURITY FROM EXTERNAL MILITARY THREAT
The highest priority of any nation is survival. India
perceives threats to her political, military, economic and
social well-being originating, unilaterally or simultan-
eously, from Pakistan and China. The succession of
Bangladesh and the subsequent defeat of Pakistan in the
1971 war reduced most of the threat to India from her
western neighbor. Through diplomatic initiatives and a
62

preponderance of military force, India seeks to discourage
further Indo-Pakistani strife. India's diplomatic goals
include deterring military aid to Islamabad from Beijing,
Washington and other Islamic nations while preserving her
security relationship with Moscow. The latter, formally
transcribed in the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty, [5] is the
bulwark of India's defense against nuclear, conventional
and guerrilla threats from China.
In addition to international recognition of her
regional primacy and territorial sovereignty, India seeks
to guarantee her access to foreign military technology and
weaponry until domestic manufacture is deemed sufficient.
Ideally, India would prefer to meet her defense needs with
conventional arms. Pragmatically, barring a disarmament
breakthrough, India will be forced to develop her own
nuclear deterrent to insure self-sufficiency in all defense
matters . This would prove all the more compelling were
Pakistan to become a nuclear power.
National views differ between the Indians and the
Soviets on how to best achieve security from external
military threats , and these differences have the greatest
potential of arousing suspicion and fracturing their close
relationship. As a nonaligned nation, India seeks to
maximize its foreign policy freedom, to balance its rela-
tions between the Soviet Union, China, and the United
States, and to keep its nuclear option open. The Soviets,
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on the other hand, seek to construct a dependable anti-
China security system in Asia, and oppose the further
proliferation of nuclear weapons .
India's more noteworthy diplomatic advances with China
have included the 1976 assignment of an Indian ambassador
to Beijing for the first time in fourteen years; the 1978
visit of a Chinese delegation to New Delhi (and its
invitation to Prime Minister Vajpayee to visit Beijing);
and the 1981 trade and border talks between India and the
Chinese foreign minister, Huang Hua . The last of these
events was particularly important, because it opened
discussions between the two countries on the long-standing
border dispute which led to their 1962 war. In an attempt
to settle the issue. Premier Deng Xiaoping offered to give
up claims along the Assam border if the Indians were wil-
ling to do the same in Kashmir. Under this plan, the
military lines of control would become the official bor-
ders, and Indian pilgrims would be permitted to visit Hindu
shrines in Tibet. [6J If subsequent discussions on the pil-
grimages and border settlement produce an agreement,
India's dependence on the Soviet Union as a deterrent
against Chinese border invasions would be virtually eli-
minated . Furthermore , the groundwork would be laid for
improvement in other Sino-Indian matters.
In an effort to ease Soviet suspicions and fears of a
pan-Asian condominium, the Indians have often stated that
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normalization of relations between India and China will not
be at the expense of India's friendship with any other
country. [7] Nevertheless, Sino-Indian detente undermines
Leonid Brezhnev's 1969 proposal for a system of collective
security in Asia, and creates unease in Moscow. It also
places the Soviets in a dilemma regarding how far they
should push their own military objectives such as seeking
more influence in Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Tension in the Indo-Soviet relationship has also
originated from Moscow's activities. New Delhi is
suspicious of Soviet-American attempts to deny nuclear
technology to Third World countries while the two super-
powers push ahead with their own proliferous policies.
Indian leaders regard these superpower attempts to mono-
polize nuclear weaponry with mixed emotions: some in India
call for an autonomous, albeit expensive, countervalue
missile development program, while others pit their hopes
on a reduction of strategic inventories through a process
of international diplomatic pressure.
Perhaps most destablizing, however, is the continuing
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Thus far, the Indian
government has confined itself to expressions of regret
while refusing to join in international condemnation of the
Soviet occupation. As Donaldson notes in a 1981 article,
[8j refrainment from public criticism is consistent with
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Indian reaction to both the 1956 attack on Hungary and the
1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.
While abstaining from comment on Moscow's accusations
that it was "provoked" into invading Afghanistan by U.S.,
Chinese, and Pakistani attempts to overthrow the pro-Moscow
government in Kabul, the Indians have privately conveyed to
Moscow their preference for Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan
.
It is not difficult to understand why a permanent
Soviet presence in Afghanistan would strain the Indo-Soviet
relationship. Afghanistan under the aegis of the British
historically provided a strategic buffer between South Asia
and the Russian Army. A permanent Soviet presence in
Afghanistan would enable Moscow to influence and even
intimidate the subcontinent with its military power. More
important in the short run, the Soviet invasion and Soviet-
sanctioned Afghan violations of the Pakistan border have
revived the U .S . -Pakistani alliance, and reduced Indian
primacy on the subcontinent.
Since the Soviet invasion, the Reagan Administration
has pledged $3.2 billion worth of assistance to Pakistan.
Of this amount, $2 billion will go toward military weapons,
including 40 F-16 fighter aircraft. The increased American
involvement with Pakistan has widened the gap between
Pakistan and India, while raising fears in New Delhi that
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American arms, supplied to defend against Russian hegemony,
may once again be used against Indian troops.
India has other reasons to be uneasy about the
continuing Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Aside from
bringing Pakistan and the United States closer together,
Pakistani support of the Mujahedin battling against the
Soviet-backed government in Kabul has strengthened Paki-
stan's relations with other Islamic states. Thus, rather
than aid Indo-Pakistani rapprochement, the Soviet invasion
has enlarged Pakistan's range of alternatives. In the mind
of one Pakistani observer, [9] Islamabad now has four
options
:
(1) to rely on American (and Chinese) military assis-
tance and guarantees
;
(2) to seek safety as part of the Moslem world;
(3) to offer friendship to the Soviet Union;
(4) to strive for the normalisation of relations with
India and to act internationally in concert with
India .
Clearly only the last option would fulfill Indian
objectives. The first or second could lead to a permanent
Soviet presence in Afghanistan and bolster the inflexi-
bility of the military-dominated Pakistani regime toward
reconciliation with India. The third was tried in the
1 960 ' s and raised such a storm of protest in India that the
Soviets quickly abandoned their attempt to balance
relations between the two countries for fear of losing
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influence within India altogether. Today, with nations
such as France, Italy, Great Britain, Brazil, and West
Germany willing to deviate from a strictly bipolar defi-
nition of the world and to supply advanced technical and
military goods to nonaligned or neutralist nations, this
alternative would be even riskier for Moscow than before.
From the Indian perspective, a South Asian union,
joined in its international purpose, has been the objective
since the 1947 partition. The Afghanistan invasion
frustrates this goal, and thus detracts from continued
goodwill between the Soviet Union and India. The Soviet
presence also raises serious questions in New Delhi regard-
ing ultimate Soviet objectives. While Soviet goals thus
far appear limited to maintaining a pro-Soviet regime in
Kabul, some in New Delhi cannot help but wonder whether
secondary objectives encompass the Indo-Soviet military
supply line. That is, how will Moscow benefit if America
rearms Pakistan? Will the Indians increase their purchases
of Soviet arms, or will they continue to diversify their
purchases, as was done in the case of the 1979 SEPECAT
Jaguar aircraft agreement? With diplomatic relations
improving between Beij ing and New Delhi , contracts between
Moscow and New Delhi for the latest Soviet weaponry are
seen as one means of maintaining Indian dependence on





Another destabilizing force surrounding the Soviet
invasion is the refugee problem. Should the influx of
Afghanistan refugees , the burden of defense spending and
the lack of grassroots support for the Zia dictatorship
combine to disintegrate Pakistan, Indians must wonder who
will reap the rewards of dismemberment. Would pre-eminence
in South Asia be shared between the Soviet Union and India
if the Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan or the North West
Frontier were to become autonomous nations? Or would the
Soviets, as the Indians would like, defer to their Indian
friends?
In all of these calculations , the future of the zone of
peace resolution looms in the background. Just as the
Afghanistan invasion has tabled the talks at present, the
disintegration of Pakistan, the creation of a pro-Moscow
state between Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean, or an Indo-
Pakistani union would alter the prospects of future
negotiations on the resolution. And, one might add, each
of these scenarios could lead to a shift in Indian percep-
tions about whether passage of the resolution was in the
national interest or not.
B. SECURE INDEPENDENCE, MAINTAIN NONALIGNMENT AND UNDUE
DEPENDENCE
Ultimately, India seeks to gain international
recognition as a great power, interacting with all but
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exclusively dependent on none. The Indians deny the Indo-
Soviet Treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation repre-
sents an alliance, and they have taken steps to diversify
their military, technical, and economic sources of supply,
thereby enhancing their nonalignment policy. Indians
condemn East-West polarization and superpower competition
in the Third World, and they espouse the South ' s position
in North-South issues. Domestically, India continues to
pursue its own form of democratic socialism, and refuses to
parrot foreign formulae for economic success
.
In the early 1970 's, India was considered by many
Western nations to be a pro-Soviet power. This perception
was based on such factors as the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty,
India's large importation of Soviet arms, unique Indo-
Soviet aid and debt-servicing and Mrs. Gandhi's frequent
references to India's "special relationship" with the
U.S.S.R. Toward the latter half of the decade, India's
political leaders sought to change the country's image.
While most of the initiative for this shift came from Mrs.
Gandhi's political opponents, there is ample evidence that
concerns about excessive dependence upon the Soviet Union
and an interest in technology which was not available from
the U.S.S.R. contributed to the Indian drive for diverse
suppliers
.
The need to renew India's nonaligned credentials was
emphasized by the Janata Party throughout the 1977
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campaign. Soon after Mrs. Gandhi's defeat, Prime Minister
Desai indicated the administration would move the country
toward a more equidistant policy, free of "special
relationships with other countries ."[ 1 ] Foreign Minister
Vajpayee, even more critical of the previous administra-
tion, indicated that the Janata Party would seek to correct
Mrs. Gandhi's "blunder of making India too .. .dependent on
Soviet Russia"[11] by pursuing a "genuinely nonaligned"
course .[12]
One of the first indications that these statements were
more than political rhetoric was the rejection of Soviet
aid and assistance in the second stage of construction at
the Bokaro steel complex. Because the Soviets lacked the
level of technology desired by Indian planners, two
American firms were offered the job instead. [13] Other
instances of diversification included:
the replacement of Soviet designs for 200-Megawatt
power generators by West Germany designs (for
generators with 1 , 000-raegawatt capacity), the gradual
displacement of Russian antibiotics by drugs based on
Italian technology, the replacement of Russian and
Rumanian oil-exploration experts and of Soviet oil rigs
with Western ones. The share of the Indian market for
machinery and equipment accounted for by Soviet imports
fell from about three-fourths in 1968 to under one-
fourth in 1977. [14]
In effect, India's rapid industrialization had equaled
or surpassed the limits of Soviet technology in specific
fields. In pursuit of a more independent foreign policy
and in an effort to fulfill its higher technology needs,
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the Desai government turned to Western Europe, Japan, and
the United States
.
This shift from Soviet dependence was not limited to
civilian manufactures. In the defense sector, the Soviet
Union had supplied roughly four-fifths of New Delhi's total
military imports between 1965 and 1977, with more than half
of the value of Soviet deliveries consisting of aircraft
and related production facilities .[ 1 5 ] By 1978, however,
West European industries had become extremely competitive
in the international arms market, and India chose several
Western licenses over advanced Soviet designs. Under a
1979 agreement, India purchased 40 SEPECAT (an Anglo-French
company) Jaguar International tactical support aircraft
instead of the advanced MIG-23. The agreement provided for
a further 45 aircraft to be assembled in India from
British-built components, leading eventually to indigenous
manufacture under license by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. [16]
Current Indian plans call for 150 aircraft in all, three-
fourths of which will be assembled and/or built by H.A.L.
One reason cited for the shift to West European
aircraft was Moscow's slow delivery of spare parts. [17]
There have been similar reports of the Indian Navy's dis-
satisfaction with Indo-Soviet trade. Writing in 1977, one
observer stated:
One of the most interesting developments in the Indian
Navy has been an increasing degree of complaint against
some of the major Soviet weapons systems including
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submarines and aircraft. For example, the Indian
Defense Diary cites with apparent approval American and
British sources to the effect that the Indians are
unhappy with the performance of the Russian F-class
diesel-powered attack, submarine. The Indians also
complain that Russian-supplied naval craft have to
undergo major modifications in Indian shipyards because
they are unstable in open seas. Besides this, they
complain about the lack of spare parts , and the fact
that still most Indian servicemen are trained on
British equipment and find the mixture of Soviet,
British, and French supplies confusing. An Indian
critic states that in 1967 Indian began to acquire
Russian naval armaments, and then he says, "so we have
'modernized' our navy, but at what cost? The Russians,
although they have translated technical books, have
refused to impart tactical doctrines for the employment
of their weapons system. This may well prove to be the
Achilles of India's Russian Navy."[18J
Consistent complaints such as the one above have led
the Indians to Western Europe in pursuit of modern
submarine and surface ship systems. To replace the Soviet-
built F-class diesel submarine, India has apparently signed
an agreement with a Swedish firm for one submarine and the
transfer of technology for pressure hull construction and
arms. [19] To modernize its surface escort fleet, the
Indian Navy acquired licenses for the British Leander -class
frigate and approached the Dutch for assistance in






From these examples, it is apparent that India has
decided to abandon exclusive dependence on Soviet arms
transfers. Instead, the leadership has chosen to "go in
for the best equipment regardless of political considera-
tions and the rupee trade account ."[ 21 ] The motivations
underlying this recent trend, however, transcend India's
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pursuit of diverse suppliers and a nonaligned reputation.
These goals, while admirable politically, create their own
logistical and maintenance nightmares. Rather, India is
seeking technological parity. By purchasing technology
transfers and engineering skills through licensing arrange-
ments, India hopes to gain the knowledge necessary to
achieve great power status
.
In the bipolar world which existed in the 1950 's,
1 960 ' s and early 1970's, a nonaligned developing nation
such as India was forced to develop a "special relation-
ship" with the East or West in order to acquire the skills
and capital it required to raise itself up. Today, many
other alternatives exist, and India, like any developing
nation, is better able to aggressively negotiate for the
most favorable terms. As long as this situation exists,
India should be able to acquire the skills it needs to
improve its global standing. Only if strict Western arras
embargoes, familiar during the previous Indo-Pakis tani
wars, are once again levied will this situation change.
Quoting from a 1970 naval journal:
Ultimately, however long it might take, India is going
to become independent in shipbuilding, as in other
fields. The direction its policies take and the pos-
ture that it assumes will be influenced by the
treatment it receives at the hands of the powers who
were in a position to help it. But, it will be
difficult indeed for India to stand upright if the West
continues to push it, however unwittingly, in the same
directions as the Russians are pulling. [22]
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In sura, India's pursuit of self-sufficiency is driven
by its quest for great power status. Ultimately India
seeks to become a leading industrialized nation, and the
pre-eminent power in the Indian Ocean. For all its
rhetoric about self-sufficiency, however, India remains a
resource-poor country which will always be dependent on
other nations for portions of its material, mineral, and
energy needs. Thus, what India is realistically seeking is
political, economic, and military parity with the great
powers in an interdependent world. Considering the fact
that nations such as Japan, France and West Germany, with
far less resource wealth than India, have already achieved
this state, it is entirely possible that India also will
someday rise to the top. The limiting factors will be the
rate at which India acquires the technology it needs, and
how quickly it assimilates that which it acquires. Both of
these factors will affect the degree of success India has
in meeting its other foreign policy goals, as well as its
relations with the Soviet Union.
C. INSULATE THE INDIAN OCEAN FROiM GREAT POWER MILITARY
ACTIVITY
India's promotion of the zone of peace resolution is
one element of a national interest which seeks security
from external military threat. Exclusion of external
navies from the region would free India from the historical
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threat of invasion from the south, and enable the country
to become a premier power in the region. Despite the fact
that India lacks the oil wealth of its Arab and Persian
neighbors, its central position, sheer size and large
populace would guarantee its status in an exclusively
littoral system.
Since the passage of the 1971 LI.N. General Assembly
resolution declaring the Indian Ocean to be a zone of
peace, Moscow has sought Indian assistance in making a
special case for the Soviet presence in the area. Specifi-
cally, the Soviets have stressed the recognized norms of
international law concerning freedom of navigation in the
open sea, the need for business calls at the ports of
coastal states, and freedom of scientific research, while
simultaneously seeking New Delhi's support for their argu-
ment that the Soviet Union has never had any military bases
in the Indian Ocean.
The Soviet effort to win diplomatic backing has
achieved only limited success. In the U.N., India has
consistently supported resolutions calling upon the elimi-
nation of bases, military installations, logistical supply
facilites, nuclear weapons, and any other manifestation of
great power military presence or rivalry in the Indian
Ocean, and has thus diverged from Soviet abstentions on the
zone of peace issue. Outside the U.N., India has been more
conciliatory. When the U.S. began to upgrade its
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facilities at Diego Garcia, Mrs. Gandhi distinguished
between the Soviet and American navies in the area:
As for the difference between the Russian presence and
the American presence, I think the difference is that
the Russians do not have a base. They may be going
back and forth, but we hear that the American base at
Diego Garcia is going to be a nuclear base. [23]
But Mrs. Gandhi's successors, seeking a more nonaligned
course, and also concerned about Soviet activities in the
Horn of Africa, were less willing to make such a generous
distinction. Following Prime Minister Desai ' s October 1977
visit to Moscow, a press report underscored his shift away
from a pro-Soviet tilt:
As far as India was concerned, it would like to see all
bases and such military or naval presence as are mat-
ters of concern to the littoral states be eliminated.
[24]
Following the expulsion of the Soviets from Somalia and
the suspension of Naval Arms Limitation Talks between the
superpowers, Foreign Minister Vajpayee's statement in the
Lok Sabha reemphasized the Janata administration's
unwillingness to separate India's U.N. position and its
public pronouncements:
The house is fully aware of the government ' s view that
the military presence of the great powers in the Indian
Ocean is a cause of tension and insecurity in the area.
The concept of a Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean
implies the elimination ot the foreign military
presence from tne area. [25]
In short, the Soviets succeeded only briefly in
acquiring Indian support for differentiation between the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. presence in the Indian Ocean. Following
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Mrs. Gandhi's defeat in \'911 , domestic opinion favored a
more nonaligned view on the zone of peace issue. Sensitive
to the Soviet desire that a distinction be made between
Soviet naval support facilities and the term "base," the
Indians avoided the definitional aspects altogether by
endorsing the U.N. prohibition of any non-littoral military
presence .
Of course, India desires more from the zone of peace
resolution than the elimination of superpower presence from
the area: ideally, it would like to insulate all non-
littoral powers from the region. At present, this includes
British and French warships; looking further ahead, it
would include the naval presence of China and other Far
Eastern states .
While not accepting the presence of a French naval
contingent in the Indian Ocean, the Indians know French
interests in the region include the protection of:
(1) energy and raw material supplies in the Middle East
and Africa;
(2) French citizens who live and work in the Middle
East and Africa;
(3) states threatened by Soviet hegemony;
(4) the sealanes around Africa, and
(5) diplomatic, economic, cultural, technical and




India and France are very similar in
their views on national self-determination.
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non-interference in other nation's affairs, promotion of
international peace, and peaceful cooperation among nations
for mutual benefit. But India has a stronger history of
anti-colonialism, and would prefer the French to devolve
their traditional security duties to nations in the Indian
Ocean littoral.
Like the French, the British also have traditional
relations in the area with states which were formerly
colonies . The British have largely withdrawn from the area
but they maintain their Diego Garcia base and facility
agreements with a few nations positioned between the Red
and South China Seas. India views the withdrawal of the
British from East of the Suez as a favorable trend--which
is still far from complete.
Ultimately, India hopes to supplant the European and
American presence with a number of its own diplomatic,
economic, and military agreements. Five islands of the
region are of particular interest in this respect
,
including Socotra, Diego Garcia, Sri Lanka, the Maldives,
and Mauritius. The first two of these are presently utili-
zed by the Soviet Union, and the United States/Great
Britain, respectively. Their geostrategic locations make
their importance to India self-evident, and discussion of
their roles as superpower bases have already been mention-
ed. Sri Lanka's strategic position beside India should
also be self-evident. One writer has compared Sri Lanka's
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position off India to that of Taiwan off China or Eire off
Great Britain. He quotes an Indian view that as long as
Sri Lanka is
friendly or neutral India could tolerate such a
situation, but should there be any danger of the island
falling under the domination of a power hostile to
India, we would have to act to protect our in-
tegrity. [26]
The Maldives and Mauritius are also of strategic
interest to India. Mrs. Gandhi visited the Maldives in
January 1975, both in an effort to encourage early
termination of the British lease on facilities in Maldives,
and to strengthen relations between the Maldives and her
own country. India's attraction to the Maldives includes
"prospects for oil and other ocean resources in the vici-
nity of the archipelago," in addition to military facili-
ties consisting of "a radio communication station, an
airfield, advanced navigational aids with equipment for the
reception of satellite weather pictures" and port
facilities visited by U.S. and British warships .[ 27
]
Since the early withdrawal of Britain from the Gan
airbase, India has encouraged the Maldives' support for the
U.N. zone of peace resolution, and was probably encouraged
when the archipelago nation turned down a Soviet offer to
lease Gan in late 1977. India's partiality toward
Mauritius includes returning Diego Garcia to Mauritius and
discouraging future base leasing arrangements between
Mauritius and non-littoral naval powers. Mauritius'
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Location in the southwest corner of the Indian Ocean was
especially important when the Suez Canal was closed
following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war; today, following the
reopening of Red Sea route and subsequent improvement of
the canal's deep-draft capability, Mauritius has lost some
of its strategic importance. India remains interested in
these two nations , however , and should seek to bring them
into future political, economic, or military plans
involving the Indian Ocean region.
In the eastern portion of the Indian Ocean, New Delhi
fears encroachment from China, Southeast Asia, and Japan.
India's fear of Japanese hegemony stems from memories of
Japan's southward advance in World War II, and focuses
today on Japan's energy and strategic material dependence.
Ramazani suggests that constriction of Japanese energy and
resource needs could encourage Japan to join ANZUS or the
U.S. in protecting sea lanes which pass through the Indian
Ocean. [28 j Since the oil crises of 1973-74 and 1979,
however, Japan has diversifed its energy sources and types
of fuels, and has begun to shift away from high energy
consuming industries. India's perception of a Japanese
"threat" (other than in terms of economic competition)
should therefore lessen appreciably.
Fears of Chinese hegemony are quite another matter.
Thus far the People's Republic of China has supported the
U.N. resolution recognizing the Indian Ocean as a zone of
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peace. Chinese support of the resolution and their refusal
to make any distinction between Soviet or American forces
when referring to Great Power rivalry in the area are
obvious attempts to anger Moscow. Ideological differences
aside, the Chinese are also seeking to undermine President
Brezhnev's 1969 plan to isolate the People's Republic of
China by creating a system of "collective security" in
Asia. China's support of legislation opposed by the
Soviets is one of a number of ways that China is seeking to
exacerbate Indo-Soviet relations. It also suggests that
China will be so preoccupied with internal political divi-
sions, economic and technological problems, Sino-Soviet
border security and the Taiwan issue that it will be unable
to construct a credible naval projection capability for
some time to come. Support of the U.N. resolution allows
the P.R.C. to deny Soviet naval intevention in a region
beyond Chinese influence.
The People's Republic of China's support of zone of
peace legislation also stems from its economic vulner-
ability. Currently China is seriously deficient in
material imports of chromium, cobalt, platinum metals,
nickel, diamonds and magnesium. It also imports relatively
large quantities of natural rubber, aluminum, copper,
vanadium, sulfur, iron ore, and steel, although consider-
able production and reserves of these materials exist
within the country. [29] Since many of these materials are
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imported from Europe and Africa, and could be restricted by
Soviet control of strategic chokepoints or Soviet inter-
vention in Africa, the Chinese are extremely sensitive
about increasing Soviet activities in these regions and
along the Indian Ocean sealanes .
The Indians are aware of China's fears and realize that
the economic growth of the P.R.C. will make the Chinese
more dependent upon critical material imports, and hence
more prone to deploy naval forces into the Indian Ocean to
insure the security of their primary sealanes. India
thinks it can prevent the entry of China's navy into the
Indian Ocean if it can remove other foreign navies with
passage of the U.N. zone of peace resolution. In the
meantime, India has sought to avoid provoking the Chinese
by refusing Moscow's persistent requests for exclusive port
facilities [30] and offers for a joint Indo-Soviet effort
in maritime cooperat ion . [ 3 1 ] Any such Indo-Soviet
agreement would compromise Indian nonalignment , threaten
the Sino-Pakistani alliance, and possibly spark a basing
arrangement for U.S. and Chinese ships in Karachi.
In addition to its "passive" measures to placate
Chinese fears, India has taken steps to guard its
commercial interests in the Bay of Bengal and within the
200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) formulated at the
Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea. One such step
is the installation of a unified command of the three
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services (quartered in Port Blair) in the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands, with a view toward protecting sea
communication from the South China Sea and the Pacific into
the Indian Ocean. Situated 831 miles away from the
mainland, these islands (the Andaman group has 204 islands
and the Nicobars number 19) are perceived as "sentinels
guarding the portals of India." [32] And indeed, whether
the Kra Canal is cut across Malaysia to facilitate the
passage of increasingly large oil tankers presently unable
to negotiate the Strait of Malacca, whether the Malacca
strait is deepened (the most feasible option) or whether
traffic is routed through the Sunda and Lombok Straits of
Indonesia, India's interest in the eastern passages will
continue. This is true not only because of perceived
challenges emerging from the area, but also because nearly
all Indian trade travels by sea. Like China, India expects
its international commerce to expand in the decades ahead.
D. PROMOTE THE MAINTENANCE OF FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS
In addition to its diplomatic initiatives with
Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China, India seeks to
establish closer ties with Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh.
As an advocate of nonalignment , India wishes to free
regional powers from foreign domination and intimidation,
without creating unjustified fears of Indian hegemony.
Farther afield, India desires closer diplomatic ties and
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balanced diplomatic relations with the Persian Gulf states
which India depends upon for nearly two thirds of her total
petroleum requirements .
Both Moscow and New Delhi are in agreement on the need
to counter Chinese communist influence in the regions
bordering India. But tension exists between the two on the
type of government which should exist in the place of
Maoist ideology. Moscow prefers a system of collective
security in Asia, while India favors an independent and
democratic state system, free of foreign domination. In
effect, the Soviets desire a pro-Moscow tilt in a bilateral
world, viewed in zero-sum terms; the Indians favor non-
alignment in an evolving multilateral system.
India's search for closer relations with other
nonaligned powers has proven more successful than Moscow's
hunt for signatories to the Asian Collective Security
System. Karen Dawisha attributes part of Moscow's failure
to the genuine antipathy of regional states (especially
Islamic countries) to communism:
This antipathy stems not only from these states'
ideological objections to communism, but also from





Dawisha adds that the invasion of Afghanistan multiplied
this aversion to communism ten-fold and "undermined, more
thoroughly than any other recent Soviet action, Moscow's
credibility as a champion of the nonaligned and national
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liberation movements ." [34 ] In deference to their fundamen-
talist Muslim brothers, as well as their own internal
constituencies , many Middle East leaders have been forced
to place Moscow at arm's length.
Nationalist sentiment in these countries continues to
favor treaties of friendship and cooperation over
entangling security pacts . Treaties allow Third World
nations to demand economic, technical, and arms aid from
the Soviets, while--as was the case in Egypt and Somalia, --
allowing some measure of freedom when circumstances dictate
a realignment of priorities.
Another reason Dawisha believes the Soviets have failed
to gain a greater foothold in the region is that they have
"underestimated the dependency of the elites in these
countries on Western values. Western life-styles and tradi-
tional economic links with Europe and the United
States. "[35 J Nationalist sentiments may be just as strong
as they were in the 1 950 ' s when Dulles tried to build an
alliance pact to contain communism, but the choices no
longer lie between just the two superpowers . Today Third
World nations can choose among a variety of European
ideologies .
India's common colonial heritage and adherence to the
nonaligned movement add to her prestige in the region. But
India's enmity with Islamic Pakistan, reluctance to
publicly condemn Moscow's Afghanistan intervention, and
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potential as a regional rival, have sometimes acted as
liabilities upon her attempts to achieve closer ties with
oil-rich neighbors in the Persian Gulf. Nonetheless, India
has secured several lucrative contracts in the area, and
Indians working on Persian Gulf projects have helped offset
India's hard currency oil debts through homeward
remittances .
Writing in 1977, Rouhollah K. Ramazani foresaw the rise
of two regional rivals within the Indian Ocean in the
period between 1985-1995: India and Iran. Since the 1979
collapse of the Pahlavi Dynasty, and the 1980 Iraqi
offensive along the Shatt-al-Arab River, predictions of
Iran's ascent to great power status have been revised.
Concerns voiced in 1977 about Iran's rapidly expanding
naval fleet and air force, and Tehran's nuclear potential,
have now shifted to encompass other states. Some observers
point to an Egyptian, Saudi, or South African succession,
but today all temper their remarks with an acknowledgement
of inherent instabilities in each state's political
foundation
.
Because it still relies heavily upon Middle East fuel
for a large proportion of its energy needs and thus, for
its continuing economic growth, India remains distressed
about the volatility of passions in the Middle East and the
security of the Strait of Horrauz . Secondary concerns
include Indian relations with states which straddle the
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sealanes to European markets, and Indonesia's potential to
dominate sealanes to the Pacific. India has improved its
relations with Indonesia since the first oil shocks of
1973-74, but remains suspicious of the country because of
Jakarta's expansionist tendencies in the 1 960 ' s .
In sum, India and the Soviet Union coincide in their
goal of countering Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean
region. It is the methods they prefer which diverge:
Moscow prefers a system of alliances, while New Delhi
prefers diplomatic and economic relations which do not
compromise its nonaligned position. India and the U.S.S.R.
both prefer stability over such unknowns as fundamental
religious movements. For Moscow, however, latent insta-
bilities represent targets of opportunity which could
ultimately test the Indo-Soviet relationship. Opportuni-
ties for Soviet intervention in Baluchistan and on either
side of critical strategic chokepoints might force the
Politburo to reasses its Indian Ocean policies and to act
in its long-term interests--despite short-term credibility
losses regarding its promotion of "status quo" Asian
borders . Any effort to establish a Soviet state on the
perimeter of the Indian Ocean, however, would dash Indian
hopes of a zone of peace free of superpower influence , and
lay the naval arms race at New Delhi's doorstep.
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E. RECEIVE MATERIAL ASSISTANCE ON THE MOST FAVORABLE
TERMS
India subscribes to the principles embodied in the New
International Economic Order (a declaration adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly in 1974) calling for the
transfer of technology, capital and profits from the
industrialized to the developing countries. The Indians
believe that Third World nations should be allowed
unrestricted access to world markets, in order that they
might compete favorably for materials, minerals and fuels.
In effect. Third World nations should be exempt from
tariffs, duties and other protectionist measures applicable
to industrialized competitors, while receiving financial
subsidies to raise living standards. India views this
assistance as an obligation of wealthy nations , which would
prove all the more feasible if the arms race and the
diversion of funds for military research, development,
procurement and assistance were halted.
India's economic strategy seeks the maximum amount of
national control and self-determination negotiable in the
international economic system. Its affinity for public
sector enterprise has at various times been chastized by
Western economists as the defensive reaction of local elite
groups seeking to protect their own power, of national
business elements with their own ambitions, or of intellec-
tuals animated by a doctrinaire hostility toward
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capitalism. Others have described it as a fear of Western
power extension, notably the "Trojan horse" syndrome, in
which the foreign enterprise is seen as an agent of
American diplomatic interests. In The Widening Gulf, Selig
S. Harrison persuasively refutes these explanations as
secondary to the often overlooked component of nationalism:
Measured by nationalist standards, public sector
industrial development often takes clear preference
,
despite a record of relative inefficiency, because it
lends itself to a greater degree of national control
than private sector development as well as a greater
eventual payoff in the state power needed for national
security. It symbolizes national progress, equally
shared, as against unbalanced development in which
disparities in wealth multiply. It is seen as a pillar
of self-reliance and independence. This identification
of the public sector with the national interest is
heightened when foreign investment pressures are
directly targeted on public sector industry as an
obstacle to investment obj ectives
.
[ 36 ]
In short, public sector enterprises represent a symbol of
national progress while providing security from elites or
foreign corporations seeking to multiply their concen-
trations of power. They allow the nation to safeguard
control of key areas of the economy by reducing dependence
on foreign aid and assistance, and hence improve the
nation's autonomy in the international sphere.
Public sector enterprise is anathema to U.S. free-trade
principles, however, and the U.S. government has histor-
ically rejected aid to India for "establishing government-
owned industrial and commercial enterprises which compete
with existing endeavors ."[ 37 ] American distaste for
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India's method of industrial development has been justified
in terms of economic "inefficiency", "U.S. protectionism"
(fear of eventual Indian competition with American
industrial exports) , and the desire to see India develop in
the U.S. image, with private industry dominating the
economy. But in the Third World, America's rebuffs have
been interpreted as a method of confining the developing
countries to agricultural pursuits, despite important U.S.
contributions in the fields of power, transportation, and
education
.
Unwilling to compromise its own national formula for
industrial development, India turned to other sources.
Moscow proved receptive to India's quest for aid because of
its identification with public enterprise and because of
Pakistan's membership in an alliance structure affiliated
with the containment doctrine. When the U.S. Congress
rejected aid for the Bokaro steel complex in August 1963,
India and the U.S.S.R. gravitated even closer together.
Between 1950-51 and 1971-72, India's trade with the
U.S.S.R. and Communist East Europe rose from 0.5 percent to
20 percent of her total exports
,
and from a negligible
amount to fully 11 percent of her imports. [38]
One factor which enhanced this relationship was a
special aid and debt- servic ing agreement which allows
Indian arms purchases without the expenditure of scarce
foreign reserves. Soviet weapons are paid for with Indian
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exports through a rupee account maintained at the Reserve
Bank, of India, which the Soviets have pledged to balance by
importing goods and services of equal value from the
subcontinent .[ 39] Another element was a Soviet economic
aid package which amounted to $1,943 billion in credits
between 1954 and 1977. [40] Finally, the Soviets proved
exceptionally reliable as an alternate supplier in times of
extreme economic hardship. Instances of particular
importance in this respect included Soviet delivery of fuel
in the wake of the 1974 oil crisis, the 1976 shipment of
heavy water for the Rajasthan power plant after a 1974
embargo by the U.S. and Canada, and a second oil agreement




Despite these close relationships, there has been a
recent decline in the importance of the bilateral relation-
ship :
Although the volume of Soviet-Indian trade has con-
tinued to rise in the 1970's, the relative weight of
Soviet imports and exports in the total Indian trade
picture has fallen off since the peak years of the late
1960s and early 1970s. [42]
There has also been a reduction in India's drawdowns of
Soviet credit. When Moscow offered a new $340 million
credit in 1977 (in anticipation of obtaining the contract
for the second stage construction at the Bokaro steel
complex) , India still had over $450 million available from
previous agreements . [43 ]
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The decline in India's dependence upon the Soviet Union
stems from many factors, some of which were mentioned
earlier. In the area of arms transfers, the lifting of the
U.S. arms embargo in February 1975, the proliferation of
alternative arms producers willing to grant manufacturing
licenses, the greater availability of foreign exchange and
credit, and India's ability to absorb more advanced
technology, have all played a part. Another factor is the
reduction of security threats resulting from the creation
of Bangladesh and closer diplomatic ties with the P.R.C.
In the economic sphere, the Soviet Union "has been
reluctant to shift away from the traditional pattern of
public-sector aid, involving primarily credits for heavily
industrial equipment, to nonproject aid and the provision
of raw materials, both of which are increasingly desired by
the Indians as their own industrial capacity expands ." [44]
Development of the Indian economy has made it competitive
with the U.S.S.R. in many of the same manufactures, and the
Indians have sought to expand their commercial trade with
the Common Market. Moreover, technology desired by India
to increase productivity, particularly in the steel and oil
industries, is often unavailable from Moscow. In these
circumstances, India has been forced to turn to equity-
sharing arrangements with foreign investors or to loans
from commercial markets and international agencies . Such a
compromise of national principles is not surrendered
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without tough conditions. In oil exploration, for instance,
India has insisted upon buying back at the prevailing
international prices the entire quantity of any oil found
until the country reaches self-sufficiency. And self-
sufficiency, given present Indian reserves, is unlikely in
this century. [45]
Despite these steps toward diversification, India's
economic options are hampered by the high cost of its
energy imports. Last year's crude oil and refined product
import bill exceeded $7 billion, equal to 80 percent of
India's anticipated export earnings. It is probable,
therefore, that India will remain dependent upon external
assistance for some time to come, and that the Soviet
Union, with whom New Delhi has already incurred a massive
debt, will be the most likely source of future soft-
currency funding. Only a shift in India's willingness to
accept foreign equity investment could change this, and,
considering the extreme reluctance on the part of the
country to make such a change in its nationalist policies,
this outcome seems doubtful.
F. SUMMARY
Writing in 1973, Stephen P. Cohen described the foreign
policies of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh as "reactive".
Each of these nations, he wrote, recognizes the marginal
role of the region, and shares four common assumptions:
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Briefly, these are: that the major threat comes from
the immediate region; that each regional power lacks
the resources to adequately defend itself and
simultaneously fulfill economic objectives; that
external ties must be developed to overcome such
deficiencies, and finally, that because of the
peripheral nature of the region, no outside power can
be fully trusted to fulfill any but the most trivial
commitments . [46 j
To a large extent, this analysis remains valid.
Despite its rhetorical quest for self-sufficiency, India is
a member of an increasingly interdependent global system,
and will remain dependent on others for political,
economic, military, scientific and technological support.
Its fierce national pride will resist agreements which seek
quid pro quo tradeoffs
,
and aid received will be perceived
as an obligatory tribute rather than a gift requiring a
demeaning expression of gratitude.
The most critical relationship between Moscow and New
Delhi will continue to be the economic tie. Moscow has
been exceptionally generous over the past three decades in
sharing its technology and assisting India's public sector
development. Moscow's economy has slowed substantially in
recent years, however, and increasingly the two nations
have been forced to part company to fulfill their indivi-
dual economic needs. In fact, the U.S.S.R. and India have
been competing for many of the same kinds of Western
assistance. Russia's great mineral and material wealth
favor her in any competition for state-of-the-art
technology; Western technology is expensive and the Soviets
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have had to divert resource exports to Western markets to
pay for imported capital equipment. This has resulted in a
constriction of supplies to Eastern bloc partners , and
rejection of Indian requests for raw material aid. For the
rest of the 1980s, the Soviet economy will continue to
require the best price available for its natural resource
exports. India will, therefore, have to improve its
productivity to generate the hard currency needed to
purchase its raw material requirements
.
The Indo-Soviet military element has become a secondary
factor in bilateral relations. Pakistan is presently pre-
occupied with Afghanistan and its own internal political
climate. Sino-Indian rapproachement has lessened India's
need for Soviet power to check border tensions. But China
and India are still not close friends, and India continues
to favor Moscow's record of reliability over China's
changing internal schisms. Eventually India may possess
the technology and economic capacity to develop its own
force de frappe . Its program of rocket and missile
research has already moved in this direction. But India
remains divided about whether it should develop a nuclear
force, and if so, what sort and how big. Although not
stated in the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty, India's friendship
with Moscow suggests that the Soviets might, if pressed to
the extreme limits of their patience, exercise the nuclear
option to protect their South Asian friend. But the
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Indians are a proud people and could decide to construct an
independent countervalue system capable of reaching Chinese
cities . Moscow would certainly disapprove of an Indian
ballistic missile deployment; but neither the Chinese,
Soviets, or Americans would be surprised by such a course.
India has long maintained that the superpowers have no
right to condemn Third World nuclear proliferation while
building larger and larger nuclear armories of their own.
Mrs. Gandhi has repeatedly stressed that India will not sit
idle while other nations fix the limits of their forces and
restrict technology and fuel transfers to the Third World.
The superpowers must reduce their nuclear inventories soon,
or expect new members to join the "nuclear club"
.
In the political sphere, India and the Soviet Union
should remain friends. Their ideologies differ but it is
doubtful that communism will make major inroads on the
subcontinent. The Hindu culture and caste system remain as
impervious as ever, and the Moslems reject the tenets of
communist atheism. Nevertheless, questions surrounding the
occupation of Afghanistan, Soviet activities in the Indian
Ocean, and superpower arms negotiations continue to strain
Indo-Soviet relations in the political sphere. Thus far
Prime Minister Gandhi's governmeni; has abstained from two
U.N. General Assembly votes condemning the Soviet Union's
December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, and has publicly
condemned Pakistan for its refusal to recognize the Moscow-
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instaiied government of Babrak Kariaal . India has even gone
so far as to blame Pakistan for intentionally blocking an
agreement that would allow the Soviet Union to withdraw its
troops from Afghanistan. At the same time, India insists





Still, public abstention in the U.N. General Assembly
has cost India a large measure of political capital.
Though consistent with India's trend of not publicly con-
demning Soviet interventions, once again the credibility of
India's nonalignment has been called into question. Des-
pite Mrs. Gandhi's contention that Pakistan is obstructing
the peace process in order to gain American and West
European aid, in addition to increased status within the
Islamic world, she certainly realizes that the Soviet
presence initiated this complex train of events leading up
to Pakistan's enhanced image. As if to return New Delhi's
favor, Leonid Brezhnev emphasized the need to create a zone
of peace in the Indian Ocean during the 26th Party Congress
in February 1981. Moscow's call for peace cost the
Politburo far less than Mrs. Gandhi's pro-Moscow
abstention, however, because it is Soviet actions on the
Horn of Africa and in Afghanistan which initially derailed,
and have continued to impede, further negotiations. In
short, there is every indication that India is growing
impatient for action to back up Soviet rhetoric.
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This impatience also extends into the realm of super-
power arms negotiations. On the one hand, India remains
eternally suspicious of any talks which threaten a division
of the world into Soviet-American spheres of influence. On
the other hand, India strongly endorses sharp reductions of
superpower forces. Since any major arms reduction would
lessen the gap between India's forces and those of other
great powers--and thereby enhance India's world power
status--such support should come as no surprise. But
India's quest for international prestige has been clouded
by Soviet deployment of long-range theatre nuclear weapons,
the Backfire bomber, and newer and larger conventional
forces . In spite of a long friendship the Soviet build-up
in the face of Western military reductions concerns Indian
strategic planners. Even before the Afghanistan invasion,
it was generally accepted that the superpowers were only
interested in achieving strategic superiority over each
other. [48] Following the Afghanistan invasion, some have
probably begun to wonder whether the U.S.S.R. is a friend
or foe .
The crucial element in future Indo-Soviet relations
will be the China factor. This is where Cohen's quotation,
which opened this section, is vulnerable. Whatever the
ideological differences, the Soviet Union needs India as a
counterweight to a hostile China. Where America's need to
befriend either Pakistan or India has oscillated over the
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course of history, as if part of a great game; the Soviet
Union, as an Asian power, has always considered it a
necessity to become involved with its neighbors. It has
invested a great sum of capital and time in the Asian
subcontinent, without obtaining either base-rights or
Indian support for the collective security system. Nor has
Moscow succeeded in deterring India's independent pursuit
of its own national interests. Yet in all likelihood, the
Soviets will continue to invest heavily in the relationship
to avoid losing such a consistent and reliable friend--in a




Indians have frequently railed against proponents of
the balance-of -power thesis. Writing in the early 1970 's,
for example, an Indian Captain stated:
In the China-South and Southeast Asian ellipse, India
is one of the 'policy centers' where power must con-
centrate; such power being ranged against China's land
and sea frontiers. In this context... to believe that
any country other than India will have either the will
or the capacity to range forces along the mighty
Himalayas to thwart Chinese design is to believe, to
say the least, in a myth that Britain had, in the
postwar world, such a capability in South Asia and her
withdrawal from the east to Suez will create vacuum. [1]
Certainly, in terms of national will, no one is better
suited to deter a drive into the subcontinent than India.
But in terms of capabilities , there can be little doubt
that the Soviet Union has a far greater military capacity
to "thwart Chinese design," and that the 1971 Indo-Soviet
Treaty plays a major role in restricting Chinese objec-
tives. Moreover, technology's advance continues to
frustrate Indian designs for great power status. Even as
India plans its blue-water fleet for tomorrow, the science
of missiles and rockets, combined with space-based command,
control, and communications (C ) systems threatens this
fleet with obsolescence.
It is for reasons such as these, perhaps, that the non-
aligned nations of the world have called for the end of the
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arms race and the creacion of non-nuclear zones throughout
the world. Like these other pleas, the zone of peace
resolution is a call for limiting the Hydra-like expansion
of superpower competition. But it is directed at only the
manifestation of the problem, and not its source. Arms
transfers, arms races, force increases, and placement of
these forces are symptoms of competing interests in a world
filled with distrust and suspicion.
The zone of peace resolution is a manifestation of the
interests of nonaligned states such as India. It is based
on the assumption that if the superpowers clear out of the
Indian Ocean, the littoral powers will be able to resolve
their differences on a more equi table--perhaps even
peaceful--basis . But this premise suffers from several
problems, not the least of which is that the littoral
states of the Indian Ocean are not equal states. Some are
blessed with greater material resources than others , some
are blessed with greater human resources and others are
blessed with greater territorial size. Each of these local
states has its own national interests in the region; and
interests, when combined with capabilities to suit them,
have sometimes resulted in friction and acts of violence.
The removal of non-littoral naval forces from the
Indian Ocean would not prevent the outbreak of conflict
within the region. Nor would a continued superpower
presence necessarily result in a lessening of tensions.
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Yet many littoral states believe that such an exodus would
benefit the region. It is this paper's contention that
this argument originates from the competing interests of
the littoral states, that these nations believe that such a
departure would give their people the freedom to fulfill
their own hegemonic aims unencumbered by outside powers
capable of restricting their ambitions. Furthermore, these
states believe that the removal of outside powers will
enable them to "catch up" with the superpowers in terms of
military and economic capabilities. In short, they think
economic and social development will advance quickly as
long as the diplomatic arm keeps non-regional interlopers
at bay
.
The weakness of this argument is that it ignores the
subtance of the problem. Unless the source of competing
national interests is resolved, conflict will continue to
exist, be it at the superpower level, the regional level,
the subcontinent level, or the intrastate level. Removal
of naval warships from the Indian Ocean does not remove the
national interests of the U.S., the U.S.S.R., or any other
non-littoral nation, from the region. The fomi of global
competition might change, but the cause of the competition
would not. Technological development would pursue a means
of protecting individual interests
, and a new method of
making ones' influence felt within the region would emerge.
Just as the U.S. need not station troops in the Soviet
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Union to make its strategic presence known in this age of
intercontinental weapons, a nation need not maintain a
platform in the Indian Ocean to make its presence felt
there
.
Today, however, such technology does not exist. While
some writers will argue that the U.S. Navy is in the region
to protect weaker nations against the stronger, and others
argue that the U.S. Navy is present to reaffirm its close
friendships with nations in the region, these missions are
secondary priorities. America is present in the Indian
Ocean because it has interests there, such as oil,
minerals, and raw materials, which have increased in
importance over the past three decades . And the means to
protect those interests from outside the region do not yet
exist. Even if the U.S. wished to devolve the role of
"regional policeman" to states such as India or Saudi
Arabia, America knows that the regional states are hardly
strong enough to protect themselves, much less join
together to give assistance to a neighbor whose sovereignty
is threatened.
The lesson of Chad is instructive in this respect. For
all the pleading and government level negotiations, it took
the French government several years to build a coalition
peace-keeping force from members of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) to replace Libyan troops in Chad. Even
after member-states agreed to join the force, Libya had to
104

be encouraged to leave. Similar negotiations are taking
place today on the rim of the Indian Ocean in an attempt to
settle the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Iran-Iraq war, the
Soviet war in Afghanistan, and the Vietnamese occupation of
Kampuchea. But, as in the case of Chad, negotiations are
slow and distrust among conferees is great. From this
standpoint, it is premature to think that a zone of peace
conclusion, satisfactory to the nonaligned nations, will be
reached in the near future. Any agreement which perma-
nently restricts the size of U.S. naval forces in the
Indian Ocean or eliminates these forces altogether would
place the U.S. at a great disadvantage vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union or any other regional competitor. Through technolo-
gical progress the Soviet Union could remove its naval
forces from the region and still present its neighbors with
an overwhelming military fait accompli Those doubtful of
this argument have only to regard the recent history of the
SS-20 (4,500 kilometer, three warhead, mobile intermediate-
range ballistic missile system) deployment in Western
Russia, the expansion and modernization of the Soviet
Union's airlift capabilities, and the increased size and
capability of the Soviet armed forces.
The United States should not surrender its naval
options. This does not imply that these forces must be
increased or maintained at a high level. Short of a direct
challenge to U.S. interests, or a request for U.S.
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assistance, the U.S. presence in the region could be small
and unobtrusive. If the U.S. were to correctly define its
regional interests and construct its forces to support
these defined roles, the number of naval vessels could be
reduced. A total exodus could only be made, however, if
adequate airlift existed to "surge" forces to the area in
times of crisis. Currently the U.S. lacks an airlift
capability which can credibly resupply the Indian Ocean
theatre, hence the U.S. cannot afford to withdraw its
entire naval contingent. Any drawdown of forces must be
linked with improved airlift capabilities and the
activities of the Soviet Union and its proxy forces.
In addition to the United States' need for a rapid
surge capability, the U.S. must accelerate its space
research, particularly in terms of reconnaissance and
3
command, control and communications (C ) capabilities. A
sophisticated space technology is essential in a region so
distant from the U.S. mainland. Land-based facilities in
this region of the world are politically unreliable, and
are maintained at enormous cost both to the U.S. and its
alliance partners . The competing forces of nationalisms
are particularly strong in the Indian Ocean region and
should be respected, rather than tested, by the use of U.S.
space-based systems to provide early warning of changing
force deployments and similar crucial intelligence
information. Improved satellite reconnaissance would also
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represent a major step forward in constructing satisfactory
confidence-building measures to allay feelings of distrust
and suspicion surrounding superpower competition.
Obviously the first step for the superpowers is to
reach agreements on mutually satisfactory surveillance and
verification procedures, in order to strip away the dis-
trust and secrecy which plague the negotiating environment.
This will prove particularly difficult for the Soviet Union
to accept, because of its xenophobic national character.
But it must be done, or the same verification problems
which defeated the ratification of SALT II will occur
again
.
Another major step toward the eventual enactment of the
zone of peace resolution is for the U.S. to come to terms
with a long-range plan for the Third World. Since the
second World War, the U.S. has attempted to impose rigid
alignments or to enforce a status quo policy, even when
"status quo" translated into support of colonialism,
racism, or autarky. "The U.3.S.R. has consistently
demonstrated more psychological and diplomatic skill than
the United States" in handling nationalist or pacifist
movements, Pierre Hassner has written, "but American
leverage and penetration have invariably proved
superior." [2] The reason for America's success is that it
respects religion, promotes freedom, believes in the
goodness of man, and represents technical progress. Each
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of these values is highly esteemed in most of the Third
World, yet the U.S. has often lost favor among this
audience because these are not the values America has
encouraged among its alliance partners. Human rights, when
properly promoted, are an excellent foreign policy tool.
America's greatest foreign policy tool, however, is its
vast store of capital, technology, and skilled workers.
Mrs. Gandhi has stressed repeatedly that security lies in
economic assistance and not security pacts. An educated
citizenry is the cornerstone of ensuring the survival of a
democratic system, and an employed and prosperous workforce
rarely turns on its leadership. The Third World desires
its own Marshall Plan, in order to fulfill its destiny as a
global partner. If it consolidated its efforts, the West
could fabricate a politico-economic plan far beyond an
ambitious Moscow's scope. Such a plan would serve Western
strategic objectives and fulfill the needs of the Third
World. More importantly, the plan would engender the
principle of prevention, rather than crisis-management.
If successful, Third World progress toward its goal of
equal partnership would accelerate , and the day when the
U.S. could devolve the security of the Indian Ocean to true
friends in the region would be so much closer. And the
objective that all parties have worked for, a zone of
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